Thứ Hai, 2 tháng 9, 2013

Whether it's those god awful "fake surveys" that you can rarely get through to get the "leet crack", "free iPhone" etc from the skiddies that aren't skilled enough to do anything else, or the ad networks that keep allowing companies such as PerformerSoft, or file hosting and redirection sites such as, LinkBucks, FileSwap, Mediafire etc etc etc, we keep seeing a plethora of blatantly

Thứ Bảy, 31 tháng 8, 2013

Just an FYI folks, I'm having a few issues with my primary machine at present, so if you've sent me an email over the past couple of weeks, please rest assured, I will get to it as soon as I can (please feel free to re-send it).

I've also fixed at least once issue with the hphosts-partial.asp file. I'm aware of an issue still affecting HostsMan users, and am awaiting a reply from a friend (

Thứ Năm, 8 tháng 8, 2013

This post is dedicated to many.. so many of wonderful individuals involved with the effort to stand against Kelihos P2P malware infection. This is an example on WHAT CAN BE DONE if InfoSec are gathered to fight malware infection. This report is totally an effort of a team contains members who simply believe the same dream, to free our internet from malware. We cannot make a list of your (so many) names but we are all know who you are and what you did. Sincerely respect with thank you very much. There were many bumpy communication was initially made, for the tense and rogue communication we apology to every inconveniences. I personally am so happy to live in an era of gentlemen like you are! #MalwareMustDie!

First, you need to know what the Kelihos Botnet & malware threat is, our previous post gives you good illustration about the threat here-->>[Previous Post]. As per you maybe noticed in the our twitter timeline, we are doing our best effort in battle with the Kelihos malware scum, yes we were haunted by this infection via RedKit Exploit Kits, TDSS, direct spam or via its botnet self-updating function itself and this "scum" still out there and feeling happy-ever-after infecting us, we just can not accept this fact.

Therefore we executed every possible effort that can be done as a bunch of volunteers of an NPO entity to suppress their growth in internet. As the efforts itself is varied from suspension, sinkhole, DNSBL block, VT/URLQuery (+etc) blacklisting, OpenDNS/GoogleDNS blocking, parallel with bunch of reports to the regional basis authorities (CERTs, GroupIB, ISPs, Registrar, ICANN, Microsoft) and to varied Sinkhole entities.

We recieved the great help and support from the people in the entities mentioned above, and also with a perfect work delegation between our team in twitter so we are able to gain a good fight and successfully resulted some good achivements within 48hours+. It is unfair to let people who help and support us by seeing only twitter as result that's why I posted our effort's report here, together with some tips and tricks used in fighting this infection in our beloved MalwareMustDie blog.

And this post is the report of the mentioned effort. Here we go..

1. Stopping the new Kelihos NS based .COM services

By the time we started this effort, Kelihos started to switch their DNS from something with ns[1-6]."\][a-z]\{7\,8\}\.".RU into the .COM tld domains with the format ns[1-6]."\][a-z]\{7\}\.".COM , we found that all of the domains was released by INTERNET.BS a well-known registrar of being abused by the cybercrime to release their infector domains. And with the great help from the very dedicated individuals mentioned above we took these domains (see below) off internet:

below is the PoC of the suspension and sinkholing result:

This is how they got into internet:

The following is some of PoC and hard evidence of the .COM that Kelihos used are in the extracted INTERNET.BS released domains database-->>[PASTEBIN]

2. The dismantling effort of .RU infectors

Currently, the main basis of the Kelihos infecion are using the .RU basis ccTLD domain. It is very important to suppress their growth in their home-base also. With the great coordination and help fro GroupIB we made effort to dismantle the other "NEW" 101 .RU "weaponized domains as per listed below:

Date: Thu Aug  8 19:54:43 JST 2013

ABJIQFIR.RU,, ns[1-6]
ACXYPZUK.RU,, ns[1-6]
AFEBIRYN.RU,, ns[1-6]
ANGENJEJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
BADMYVOK.RU,, ns[1-6]
BEZGESUK.RU,, ns[1-6]
BITITROJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
BOVEWHAV.RU,, ns[1-6]
BOWRETTI.RU,, ns[1-6]
CICDIWYH.RU,, ns[1-6]
COLYDQEC.RU,, ns[1-6]
CYVWYDJE.RU,, ns[1-6]
DAHADKYZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
DEPCOPUQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
DEQYPPIL.RU,, ns[1-6]
DIICUHXA.RU,, ns[1-6]
EJOPOWOZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
EJQIURMY.RU,, ns[1-6]
FITUZVOF.RU,, ns[1-6]
FOJEGGUF.RU,, ns[1-6]
GAJKUKUC.RU,, ns[1-6]
GECAKCEM.RU,, ns[1-6]
GYCBOKUD.RU,, ns[1-6]
HURVINEV.RU,, ns[1-6]
HUZNEJEX.RU,, ns[1-6]
HYNEQREL.RU,, ns[1-6]
IMKYHTUG.RU,, ns[1-6]
IPXYJYOQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
ITWILMEP.RU,, ns[1-6]
IWKYXSEZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
IXMUTIRI.RU,, ns[1-6]
JAHKUXYV.RU,, ns[1-6]
JEFDYWSO.RU,, ns[1-6]
JIQLIDOX.RU,, ns[1-6]
JOKLASAN.RU,, ns[1-6]
KAPKICOH.RU,, ns[1-6]
KEBWAKQY.RU,, ns[1-6]
KICSIHOP.RU,, ns[1-6]
KIZCIVZE.RU,, ns[1-6]
KUBGYBOH.RU,, ns[1-6]
KYCROTUS.RU,, ns[1-6]
LICLAJLE.RU,, ns[1-6]
LIMJOZEH.RU,, ns[1-6]
LIZECGIJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
LUFRUDET.RU,, ns[1-6]
LUPQUXSE.RU,, ns[1-6]
LYOHGEOF.RU,, ns[1-6]
MAPUHXAF.RU,, ns[1-6]
MOHGOXEB.RU,, ns[1-6]
MYBFABWI.RU,, ns[1-6]
NECUWFEW.RU,, ns[1-6]
NENKUDYF.RU,, ns[1-6]
NICLYCOM.RU,, ns[1-6]
NOJQAVYJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
NORWOLLU.RU,, ns[1-6]
NUKUNNOQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
ONSUGNEM.RU,, ns[1-6]
ORNEVKYC.RU,, ns[1-6]
PEXDAJYP.RU,, ns[1-6]
PIVGEVIT.RU,, ns[1-6]
PIYMNYFA.RU,, ns[1-6]
POWERWIK.RU,, ns[1-6]
PUPUXHEF.RU,, ns[1-6]
PYDAJZYK.RU,, ns[1-6]
QABADPIX.RU,, ns[1-6]
QOFHIRAW.RU,, ns[1-6]
QYSQUWKO.RU,, ns[1-6]
RIFAUTIR.RU,, ns[1-6]
RIZIKCUG.RU,, ns[1-6]
ROVSYMWO.RU,, ns[1-6]
RYTEOPBY.RU,, ns[1-6]
SAWSOBCY.RU,, ns[1-6]
SOMOXBET.RU,, ns[1-6]
TAFIBCUM.RU,, ns[1-6]
TAZGYVAX.RU,, ns[1-6]
TITGOQTE.RU,, ns[1-6]
TYZFOWFE.RU,, ns[1-6]
UWPAYTNU.RU,, ns[1-6]
VEFLOHGY.RU,, ns[1-6]
VEKDEGYL.RU,, ns[1-6]
VUZNIQIK.RU,, ns[1-6]
VYFUXTIS.RU,, ns[1-6]
WANZAWBY.RU,, ns[1-6]
WODYFWOD.RU,, ns[1-6]
WORLIPXO.RU,, ns[1-6]
XAKRYXOG.RU,, ns[1-6]
XIMIRSEX.RU,, ns[1-6]
XIMXAMLI.RU,, ns[1-6]
XUGNEMYQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
YFKYTXIX.RU,, ns[1-6]
YFXIGUSO.RU,, ns[1-6]
YGXEYVXI.RU,, ns[1-6]
YJSEYGFY.RU,, ns[1-6]
YWHYIWDY.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZADNAZVO.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZUNCUHAK.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZUVNENAX.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZUZVAQAW.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZYHIJWIN.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZYRTYDAJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
From the status of weaponized by Kelihos to infect as per recorded HLUX's A records in here:
Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2013 11:43:40 -0700 (PDT)

And currently in blocking effort with OpenDNS & sinkhole the below RU domains:
EJWOPWYZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
EKREDTEF.RU,, ns[1-6]
EQGYQTAD.RU,, ns[1-6]
EVLYLTUX.RU,, ns[1-6]
FIBLOQAF.RU,, ns[1-6]
FINQIMIG.RU,, ns[1-6]
FOHKYQUW.RU,, ns[1-6]
FOWAJKUG.RU,, ns[1-6]
FYBYNKEQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
FYDIWGAZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
FYGJUGLI.RU,, ns[1-6]
FYJTIHOX.RU,, ns[1-6]
FYTUCTOX.RU,, ns[1-6]
GEGDYRAG.RU,, ns[1-6]
GEGMULAD.RU,, ns[1-6]
GENUVBIZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
GIZROSCA.RU,, ns[1-6]
GUQIDRUV.RU,, ns[1-6]
HAMOVLOX.RU,, ns[1-6]
HAZLYDUW.RU,, ns[1-6]
HIHFELGO.RU,, ns[1-6]
HIILOSAB.RU,, ns[1-6]
HIKKINUF.RU,, ns[1-6]
HOKKINYF.RU,, ns[1-6]
IVKEUHUW.RU,, ns[1-6]
IXCUPDAM.RU,, ns[1-6]
JIBDEFUP.RU,, ns[1-6]
JIXUDRER.RU,, ns[1-6]
JUQUTSAF.RU,, ns[1-6]
JURLYQYR.RU,, ns[1-6]
JUVBEBEC.RU,, ns[1-6]
JYHVYCLI.RU,, ns[1-6]
JYSHIWIK.RU,, ns[1-6]
KANRUQYC.RU,, ns[1-6]
KEJIKKIB.RU,, ns[1-6]
LAWNUPAS.RU,, ns[1-6]
LENEVRYP.RU,, ns[1-6]
LIFNAGCI.RU,, ns[1-6]
LILXAJTE.RU,, ns[1-6]
MEDULZAL.RU,, ns[1-6]
MOJJIQUF.RU,, ns[1-6]
MUBYBLAZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
NADKEWLO.RU,, ns[1-6]
NEQAJDAC.RU,, ns[1-6]
NUJOJPAL.RU,, ns[1-6]
PABOBBAH.RU,, ns[1-6]
PELVOJEL.RU,, ns[1-6]
PEQINNIR.RU,, ns[1-6]
PIGOVFIJ.RU,, ns[1-6]
PYMSILIQ.RU,, ns[1-6]
QAQIQGOD.RU,, ns[1-6]
QEGYRDAD.RU,, ns[1-6]
QEHWOCSI.RU,, ns[1-6]
RALYMEBU.RU,, ns[1-6]
RAWPENEP.RU,, ns[1-6]
RAZCAMIT.RU,, ns[1-6]
RETUCWYX.RU,, ns[1-6]
RIHSYCVO.RU,, ns[1-6]
RIZOMCOF.RU,, ns[1-6]
RYCNISAV.RU,, ns[1-6]
RYGXUQYF.RU,, ns[1-6]
SECZYPRY.RU,, ns[1-6]
SEPOILOK.RU,, ns[1-6]
SIPVAQBE.RU,, ns[1-6]
SOKXENBY.RU,, ns[1-6]
TERUJBIH.RU,, ns[1-6]
TYVWUQAL.RU,, ns[1-6]
UDPYCBEL.RU,, ns[1-6]
UHHUWTEG.RU,, ns[1-6]
UJDOGVIC.RU,, ns[1-6]
UQEBENEW.RU,, ns[1-6]
VESYKVEL.RU,, ns[1-6]
VUVSIMXO.RU,, ns[1-6]
WYMCEKIN.RU,, ns[1-6]
XUBQOBOH.RU,, ns[1-6]
XUVGYSCI.RU,, ns[1-6]
XYBYHCYZ.RU,, ns[1-6]
XYTFYRSU.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZAGTYCAM.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZEVIJAEF.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZUCFIZME.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZUQTIZYH.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZYCPOHDU.RU,, ns[1-6]
ZYVMYSXA.RU,, ns[1-6]
Belos is the official information received from GroupIB for SUSPENSION of 100 another domains Kelihos we reported, which was swiftly followed in less than 48 hours! :-)
Dear Partners,

Group-IB CERT (CERT-GIB) has suspended the following domains:

3. How we PoC an NS infector in commercial TLD

This is how we always PoC the new infector in the wild, we share this as a know how for everyone to help to be able to spot and report the new infection, we use our PoC for OSIKKID.COM as per below:

'(1) Spreads the HLUX as per below checks:'

bash-3.2$ date
Thu Aug 8 12:57:18 JST 2013

// the HLUX IP..

bash-3.2$ while true; do dig +short OSIKKID.COM; sleep 1; done

'(2) Serving Payload malware of Kelihos'
and every A records is serving Kelihos payload:
// Below is the currently download PoC:

bash-3.2$ while true; do wget h00p://OSIKKID.COM/rasta01.exe; sleep 1; done
--2013-08-08 12:59:14-- h00p://
Connecting to||:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200
Length: 1221261 (1.2M) []
Saving to: ‘rasta01.exe’
Last-modified header invalid -- time-stamp ignored.
2013-08-08 12:59:22 (260 KB/s) - ‘rasta01.exe’ saved [1221261/1221261]

--2013-08-08 12:59:42-- h00p://
Connecting to||:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... ç200
Length: 1221261 (1.2M) []
Saving to: ‘rasta01.exe.2’
Last-modified header invalid -- time-stamp ignored.
2013-08-08 12:59:53 (1003 KB/s) - ‘rasta01.exe.2’ saved [1221261/1221261]

'(3) INTERNET.BS registration is current MO.'
It is proven behind the registration process of this domains
We tried to remotely extracted the registrar: INTERNET.BS released
domain from current day until Jun the 1st, and this domain is one of it:

bash-3.2$ whois
Whois Server Version 2.0
Domain names in the .com and .net domains can now be registered
with many different competing registrars. Go to
for detailed information.
Domain Name: OSIKKID.COM
Whois Server:
Referral URL:
Name Server: NS1.OSIKKID.COM
Name Server: NS2.OSIKKID.COM
Name Server: NS3.OSIKKID.COM
Name Server: NS4.OSIKKID.COM
Name Server: NS5.OSIKKID.COM
Name Server: NS6.OSIKKID.COM
Status: clientTransferProhibited
Updated Date: 06-aug-2013
Creation Date: 18-jun-2013
Expiration Date: 18-jun-2014
>>> Last update of whois database: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 04:03:30 UTC <<<

'(4) The linked DNS services used with the previous Kelihos reported NS services:'

The NS1. of this domains is linked with the same NS as previous reported:
ns2.OSIKKID.COM = ns5.ns4,
...and so on...

'(5) The infection raised in RU are causing by OSIKKD.COM NS server:'
The 100 domains RU are needed to be blocked with the same pattern as we previously reported to Group IB, under REGGI.RU, (and FYI the abuse of the RU by the kelihos is more than 12,000 domains not included this one... )
This is the PoC that the domains of RU was registered 24hrs more under the OSIKKD.COM NS :
person: Private Person
registrar: REGGI-REG-RIPN
created: 2013.08.06
paid-till: 2014.08.06
free-date: 2014.09.06

Below is the check of the reported RU affiliated by the NS of the OSIKKID.COM crossed by the IP and DNS:


4. Monitoring The Actual Infection Range

As per today before the NS sinkholing on effect, with the great effort of our members we monitor the infection of the 1,287 IP address actively distributing Kelihos malware payload all over the world as per listed in our pastebin here-->>[LINK]

You can add the /rasta01.exe after the IP to get the latest Kelihos sample payload for your research purpose, as per below sample:

The below binary files also can be used for the same monitoring purpose:


These infection is plotted in the good graphical interface by Chris J Wilson as per below:

Infection based per ASN:

Infection based by country:


The effort is not stopping now.. see below:

And what a FAST action from our friends!! See the time stamp in the tweets, it is AMAZING to suspend & sinkhole malware domains THAT fast! :-)) (you guys rocks!!)
We work hard on trying to break this "Kelihos" legend methodologically and the method works!
Don't ever let the Kelihos scums enter the internet! Spot & stop them instantly, cooperate with the abused registrar to get the new infectors go to sinkholes and to suspend those new domains instantly.
They weakness is in their DNS, these services backboned their payload distribions of thousands IP and infector domains. And those DNS are using static addresses of un-removeable machines. This IS a target to be shutdown!
Thus, DO NOT let those NS getting any domains in our internet! Is not easy to shift their DNS, it hurts them very bad, they just change the name server domains time after time. And right now they need to have a non-RU domains for their DNS to survive their botnet longer.
Let's build the procedure to SPOT, BLOCK, SUSPEND & CLEAN-UP in one flow altogether!
We need your help, your support in coordination with Kelihos botnet's suppress effort. Please cooperate!

Recent Updates

And even registrar also cooperated beforehand w.o waiting sinkhole :-) Thank you!

Our friend, Chris J Wilson was making great statistic of the latest infection data:

Country base infection data:

AS Number base infection data:

Terrific world map of infection by chris J Wilson:

Graph URL is here-->>[LINK]

After .COM the Kelihos moronz shifts to .ME, .ORG & .INFO
Is an idiotic and pathetic act, they don't know with whom they are dealing with now..


Thứ Tư, 7 tháng 8, 2013

The hpHOSTS Hosts file has been updated. There is now a total of 218,563 listed hostsnames.If you are NOT using the installer, please read the included Readme.txt file for installation instructions. Enjoy! :)Latest Updated: 07/08/2013 16:19Last Verified: 04/08/2013 12:00Download hpHosts now!

Thứ Năm, 1 tháng 8, 2013

"I dedicated this post to our members on visit to BlackHat & Def Con 2013, who's helping to present our group in the security community, with deeply regret that I could not make it to go there, no matter how bad I would like to.
Thank you to @hugbomb, @set_abimone and @kafeine for the help in the spotting redirection, EK confirmation and flushing samples, to @hFireF0X and other Kernel Mode members for helping figuring & quick mitigating the new version of Zero Access spotted in this threat!"


I was mentioned about an infection by our team's @hugbomb: I cleaned the site within 24hrs, after releasing my neck of the woods.. :-)
I made domestic report in here -->>[], and this is the post about how the malicious redirection was made.

The nature of the infection is, only IE browser with java plugin access is affected, a non direct access. Some parts of the a kind of ACL used in this redirector us still on decoding process, so maybe we can report more feature they use upon 100% finished. If you meet the accepted condition, you will be redirected to Glazukov Exploit Kit to infect you with Zero Access/Sireref malware. I had hard time in confirming this site, so I had to ask many friends to confirm the case and its condition by some tests. The good thing is the site's admin is very supportive and asked me to make investigation properly and allowing this post to be publicly published to prevent more infection.

First, we have to be sure WHICH CODES and WHERE had been injected:

Is that it?? Nope.. The diff result shows more, during the injection session, the header was added with these stuff too:

< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 10:24:55 GMT
< Server: Apache
< X-Pingback: h00p://VICTIM.SITE/xmlrpc.php
< "Set-Cookie: stats=446501053769c06c565094b26d26e8ef;
expires=Mon, 29-Jul-2013 13:24:56 GMT"
< Connection: close
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
< Content-Length: 61451
↑Noted this: the header was added with the setting of cookie with stats variable and an expiry date which doesn't exist during the normal mode.
OK, let's move on and see carefully how the breakdown of the injected code goes:


We see the javascript tagged codes, usage of specific cookie, user will be firstly forced to call the landing page of Glazunov Exploit Kit at upper URL, then the checking interface of browser components using PluginDetect (noted: version 0.8.1) will be performed, the condition in Java Exploitation will depend on detected Java version.

If the Java version is ver 7 the JNLP base infection via "buj58i7kc3.jnlp" will be perform, or else the direct Jar class "weptblklaadp.nfpmuqaplgapmsrrmnranye.class" of "" a CVE-2013-1493 JAR Exploit. In my previous report here -->>[] I know the payload is a new type of ZeroAccess/ MaxPlus / Sireref payload trojan.

Pictures of the infector components and CVE method used in the Jar(ZIP) infector

Spotting the infection source

So how this code can be injected? This is the point of this post.
Please see the picture above in the marked red below part. It stated:

<!-- WP Super Cache is installed but broken. 
The path to wp-cache-phase1.php
in wp-content/advanced-cache.php must be fixed! -->
Confirming this to the site owner and found that error wasn't suppose to be happened.

I executed the first stage on checks by run into .htaccess, php.ini, default.php etc, wasn't finding anything suspicious, and went deeper to find the apache module is in place, so does the web server daemon used.
Went back to .htaccess and found myself staring into this line :

RewriteCond %{DOCUMENT_ROOT}/wp-content/cache/supercache/%{SERVER_NAME}/$1/index.html -f
RewriteRule ^(.*) "/wp-content/cache/supercache/%{SERVER_NAME}/$1/index.html" [L]

OK, this is the Wordpress Super Cache plugin is running, intrigued by the error caused by the same plugin made me dive into the plugin directories:

2013/07/23 00:00 514 advanced-cache.php
2013/07/23 00:00 1,259 wp-cache-base.php
2013/07/23 00:00 2,988 wp-cache-config-sample.php
2013/07/23 00:00 25,524 wp-cache-phase1.php
2013/07/23 00:00 60,553 wp-cache-phase2.php
2013/07/23 00:00 180,031 wp-cache.php
2013/07/23 00:00 52,772 wp-super-cache.pot
This is just perfectly strange, since everything was installed on 2012/07/23 at exactly midnight :-)) lame..
Just to be sure I made detail comparison to the original plugin:
To find the size changes, but no differences in codes after I "diff"-ed them.. weird.. Making me think the attacker was storing stuff to normal after injection stored?

Let's see what we got now, WP cache plugin error, strange plugin files dates, and an injected code.

Went back to the injected code, found that the obfuscation built by Zend, and using this as grep "significant" character to find the list of the injection code's file sources:

Noted: the yellow color is the files and their path, all of them was injected in the first lines, and the green color is the similarity found in Zend framework builder used.

below is the list of these injectors:

And now we know why the error in the top page occured! :-)

The attacker also injected codes in the current WordPress Theme used by the victim, again I pasted the "atahualpa" theme files injected by the malware code:\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\comments-paged.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\comments.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\footer.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\functions.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\index.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\legacy.comments.php\wp-content\themes\atahualpa\searchform.php
Seeing closely into each file we can guess WHEN the attacker was replacing these files:

Understanding how the malicious code works..

Well, the code used to inject pages is as per pasted "safe" code here-->>[PASTEBIN]
The first level of obfuscation process extracted from the code is-->>[PASTEBIN]
With noted(AGAIN): The code is only for view and can't be executed, a.k.a. I "hexed" the codes.

Following the decoded one, in the below line number you'll see this codes:

It shows the regex operation to grab and replace the original contents, and insert the injection code after assembled with the tags <BODY and </HTML (marked in purple color), to be noted all of these are possible by the abuse of Wordpress plugin mentioned.

I tried to manually further decode to find two similar pattern obfuscation blocks, each block contains these parts with the below logic:

Obfuscation block...


Parser of the decoded codes..

Well the above codes are a rough copy-paste of my notepads, all you have to do next is grab the blob of data, modified a bit as per those moronz wanted, decode it using the logic seen in the decoder parts, and parse it out.

I tried to follow the flow of codes manually, use only one text editor, but it looks like things went off the rails somewhere.. So it looks like I get stuck in the final decode status here -->>[PASTEBIN]

During to the decoding the blob manually, some of the interesting result shown:

Exclusion of the user agents...

$user_agents = array ("Google",
Passing ot the user-agent to the Exploit Kit url...
implode("|", $user_agents)."/i",
( isset($_COOKIE['stats'])))
At this point I realize that more effort in de-obfuscation will take more time and energy (I have to do it from beginning all over again), which I don't have thise right now, not in the weekdays. So I reproduced the injection source script in the PHP with WP server test environment to get the injection code as per pasted here, bit by bit in text -->>[PASTEBIN]
Noted that the path of the exploit kit and the name of zip/Jar file name has changed. The code is hexed also.

I look further to finish decoding this weekend, hope this writing helps people who got hit by the same threat. Be free to ask me question via comment part of this post.


Our members found the trace of similar obfuscation, assumed the previous attacks. So is in the wild..

Moral of the Story

This threat is harmful, as harmful and nasty as a Rogue Apache modules or a Rogue Web Server; Wordpress Super Cache is providing every tools to make the redirection, to control the access, to grab HTTP request and change & parse it into a malicious one in a snap.. And better yet, is easy to be implemented by hacker.. I mean, all they do is making sure you have the old version of WP Super Cache (which can be found out by remote/HTTP checks), brute (or buy) your (stolen) FTP account (somehow) and things like I posted here will happen. The attacker doesn't even need to hack your Apache module, and no need to have root permission to replace the web server related system, thus not leaving many traces (i.e. no .htaccess, no ptp.ini , no default.php, no strange conf to touch..), and a successfully attacker can camouflage their codes like putting a needle in a haystack. And with noted, this is a real IR case friend.. a PoC to what we should aware more of this threat.

I hope all of the WP users to aware of the security risk on using useful plugins they use, as much as they aware its usefulness. Stay update your versions of CMS and its plugins, change your FTP server password regularly (I don't say oftenly) and your risk to have a hacked server like this will be minimized.

Stay safe friends!


Thứ Ba, 30 tháng 7, 2013

Just when you thought it couldn't get stupider than Cameron' imposing of the smut ban in the UK, this Russian politico has decided to out-do Cameron in the "yep, we can be even more brainless!".

This woman has clearly never seen some of the Russian and Ruskranian blackhat forums I monitor (or for that

Thứ Năm, 25 tháng 7, 2013

Looking up the POST beep codes for a Sony Vaio, led me to a thread on a few minutes ago, which rather disgustingly (I'd say surprising, but I'm not surprised by SysTweaks ongoing badness anymore - they've been at it so long), led to 4 more examples, of misleading advertising, one belonging to Spark Trust, and 3 others belonging to SysTweak.

The first [1] of these, is at least